Executive Summary

Using our two unique databases on corporate misconduct, Violation Tracker and Violation Tracker UK, we find that total penalties issued by US regulators since 2010 are substantially higher than those issued by their UK counterparts.

These differences are especially salient:

  • In the UK, there are far fewer cases against large companies, particularly when it comes to price-fixing.
  • In areas like government contracting, the US has a far more robust system of safeguards against procurement fraud.
  • Private litigation in all areas is more prevalent in the US than in the UK, mainly due to the widespread use of “class action” lawsuits.
  • When it comes to worker protection, the UK is missing the central enforcing body that exists in the US, the Department of Labor. UK individuals are by and large left to take on rogue employers themselves.

Introduction

It is election year in the United Kingdom, and many are hoping that a change of government will bring about a better deal for workers, the environment, and the general public. When it comes to protections and enforcement of regulations, the party that forms the next government will set funding levels for UK government agencies and local government, appoint agency leads, and decide whether new legislation will be enacted to protect the public from corporate misconduct.

This year, we at Good Jobs First will be working with other organisations to use Violation Tracker UK to take stock of enforcement in the UK since 2010. In this, our first UK report, we compare UK enforcement with that in the US.

With our two comprehensive databases tracking corporate regulatory infringements, one on each side of the pond, Good Jobs First is uniquely placed to compare the enforcement of regulations between the two countries. For this report, we focus on four areas of regulation – labour market, government contracting, price-fixing and anti-competitive practices, and the environment.

A History of ‘Cutting Red Tape’

Regulation in the UK has been highly influenced by the idea of responsive regulation. That is, regulation based on the assumption that most corporations are effective at self-regulation. When non-compliance is suspected, in the first instance advice should be issued. This should escalate to more punitive measures only when a company remains unwilling to change its behaviour.

These ideas influenced the Hampton Review, a report commissioned by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown into the scope for reducing administrative burdens. This review recommended that inspections should be reduced in favour of compliance advice, that regulatory resources should be allocated based on risk assessment, and that the concept of ‘self-enforcement’ should provide the basis from which regulations should be devised; in other words, the regulator should make it as easy as possible for a company to comply. Subsequent legislation implemented these recommendations, which removed a considerable number of regulatory requirements from businesses.

The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 further integrated ideas that favoured light-touch regulation. Drawing from both the Hampton Review and the Macrory Report of 2006 as well as a paper intitled Next Steps on Regulatory Reform from that year, it introduced new civil sanctioning powers, to reduce the reliance on criminal prosecutions and a duty for regulators to reduce the regulatory burden on companies.

Conservative governments since 2010 have continued to deregulate, alongside large-scale cuts in real terms to agency budgets.

One result of these changes is the high number of enforcement actions with small monetary penalties or none at all. In Violation Tracker UK, 57% of the entries have no monetary penalties and another 24% have amounts below £5,000. In the US, enforcement actions without monetary penalties are so uncommon that the database does not include them. Fines below $5,000 are also excluded.

Labour Market Enforcement

In the UK it is largely the responsibility of individual workers to seek redress from an employer when their rights have been violated. Violation Tracker UK has recorded £243 million in compensation paid to workers via employment tribunals since 2017.

In the US, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 gave the federal government primary responsibility for enforcing rules regarding minimum wages, overtime pay and child labour. The Labor Department’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) is the main enforcement agency for most of the labour force. US total penalties in relation to wage and hour offences, when adjusted for population difference, amounts to £897 million.

Unlawful Deductions from Wages or Wage Theft. When it comes to unlawful deductions from wages, UK workers must take employers to tribunal – a lengthy process that involves first engaging with dispute resolution through the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). Only in cases where workers have not been paid the minimum wage will the government take enforcement action via HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC). HMRC can order companies to pay what they owe to workers and additionally penalise a company up to 200% of arrears capped at £20,000 per worker. The Department for Business and Trade ‘names and shames’ these companies via a list published annually. 3178 such cases are recorded on Violation Tracker UK, that represent £41.4 million in arrears returned to workers by HMRC orders since 2014.[1] In a report published last year, the Resolution Foundation found that non-compliance with labour laws was widespread; almost one-third of the lowest paid workers were underpaid the minimum wage.

There are more than 83,000 entries on wage and hour cases on our US tracker dating back to 2010, with over $12 billion in penalties. Sixty percent of the cases were handled at the federal level by the WHD. Many of these cases are related to wage disputes, including minimum wage, overtime pay, record keeping, and youth employment standards. The agency also focuses on misclassification (when workers are improperly designated as independent contractors), retaliation, and the Family and Medical Leave Act.

Nearly all the remaining wage and hour cases come from state labor departments and attorneys general and local regulatory agencies, such as Denver Labor or Seattle Office of Labor Standards, which have been set up to focus on wage theft. Local cases are sometimes brought by district or city attorneys.

Discrimination. Most discrimination cases in the UK are taken to tribunal by individual workers. However, a small number of cases make it to the Equality and Human Rights Commission and its equivalent in Northern Ireland. In the US, three-quarters of cases of workplace discrimination are handled by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); 1768 EEOC cases are recorded from 2010 on the Violation Tracker database. 55 EHRC cases are recorded on Violation Tracker UK, meaning the UK body is enforcing less than its US counterpart even with population adjustments.

Human Trafficking and Forced Labour. Both countries have enforcement gaps when it comes to human trafficking and forced labour.

In the UK agencies with responsibility for protecting the most marginalised workers rarely prosecute. The Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority run a licensing scheme designed to prevent the bad actors from operating in industries vulnerable to exploitative practices, they also investigate reports of modern slavery. Since 2008 however this authority has only undertaken 193 convictions, only six of this total was for modern slavery. To date it has revoked 347 licences, far fewer in recent years.

Similarly the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate has successfully prosecuted only 23 cases since 2010, with cases taken against individuals rather than companies.

In the US, the WHD does not tend to use the terms human trafficking or forced labor, although some of the cases it handles are dealing with these abuses. This leaves major gaps in enforcement outside supply chain monitoring.

Group Claims or Collective Action Lawsuits. In the UK, some law firms bring workers together to make group claims at employment tribunals. These cases can take years before workers see any compensation. The first stage of a landmark equal pay case against Asda brought in 2014 was won at a 2016 employment tribunal, the judgment was appealed but was eventually upheld at the Supreme Court in 2021 but will likely take years still before it reaches a conclusion. These are opt-in cases, meaning only workers who have joined the claim are eligible to benefit from any compensation orders.

Our US Tracker contains over 1,400 entries on significant wage and hour collective action lawsuits, with total settlements and awards of $8 billion since 2010. While most cases brought by the WHD and state and local agencies involve smaller companies, the private litigation typically targets larger employers. Major companies such as Walmart and FedEx have paid hundreds of millions of dollars to settle such cases.

As the system of labour market enforcement differs so significantly between the US and UK, a direct comparison is difficult. Excluding employment tribunals, £1.87 billion in penalties is recorded on Violation Tracker UK as employment-related enforcement. Most of this total is in compensation orders and penalties issued for pension offences by the Pensions Regulator and Pensions Ombudsman. HMRC do not publish fines issued in relation to wage arrears, which if included would likely increase the total.

While it is difficult to compare figures, the US system of a central enforcement body helped by state and local agencies for wage and hour violations reduces pressure on individual workers to navigate the system when it comes to unlawful deductions from wages.

Government Contracting Offences

The prosecution of companies who have committed procurement fraud is largely non-existent in the UK. In contrast, US government agencies have recovered over $39 billion since 2010 for government contracting related offences. Adjusted to match the UK for population size, this is equivalent to £9.8 billion.

UK

In March 2023, the National Audit Office published a report into tackling fraud and corruption against the government. This report found significant failings in the monitoring of procurement and commercial fraud. According to their investigation, in four out of five government departments examined, measurement of the amount lost to fraud in the supply of goods and services to central government was ‘non-existent’, ‘clearly unreliable’ or did not cover a sufficient area of spend.

The weaknesses in the regulatory system in the area of procurement fraud became especially apparent when it came to contracts issued during the covid pandemic. Media outlets have already exposed alleged instances of corruption and fraud, with particular focus on the case of PPE Medpro – a newly formed company with connections to a conservative peer that benefitted from the government’s ‘VIP lane’ for covid contracts.

The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) is currently suing PPE Medpro, seeking to recover the £122 million it paid for 25 million pieces of alleged sub-standard personal protection equipment (PPE) that were never used by the National Health Service (NHS), as well as the costs of storing and disposing of them. Meanwhile the National Crime Agency is investigating the beneficiaries of these contracts Baroness Michelle Mone and her husband Doug Barrowman for alleged conspiracy to defraud, fraud by false representation and bribery. Other high-risk areas identified were in eye care contracts taken out by the DHSC, procurement by the Ministry of Defence and in the purchasing of goods and services by the Ministry of Justice.

Despite sharing in an estimated £33.2 to £58 .8 billion worth of combined fraud and error loss to the government in 2020-2021, procurement fraud is rarely prosecuted. The vast majority of prosecutions by the Serious Fraud Office are international bribery cases, with only two companies successfully charged for UK-based fraud. These were two deferred prosecution agreements (DPA) made with Serco and G4S in which the companies accepted responsibility for fraud offences against the Ministry of Justice, but whose prosecutions were suspended with the proviso that they met certain conditions.

Other high-profile cases of government contracting failures have not resulted in prosecutions or DPAs. In some cases, money was instead withheld by the contracting authority. For example in the case of G4S failing to provide the required number of security guards for the 2012 Olympic Games, Capita’s failure to provide translators for which it had more than £46,000 deducted from the contract, and deductions from various Department for Work and Pensions contracts with companies failing to meet targets in disability assessments.

At the pre-contract stage, bid-rigging – where companies organise together to submit false bids to inflate prices, can face enforcement action from the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) under competition law, though rarely do. This year the CMA fined ten construction firms for engaging in this activity. This is not specific to government contracting, although in this case some of the bid-rigging occurred on public tenders.

Post-contract, the most common types of fraud are overcharging by the supplier, substandard goods or services or failure to complete the contracted work. A 2014 report by the National Audit Office found that of 60 central government contracts examined, 34 contained billing issues. In a 2020 review into local government fraud and corruption risk, the vast majority of case studies cited were against individuals for corruption. In cases where a supplier was implicated, the penalty appears to be simply paying back the money that was fraudulently obtained. The report also identified that there was no central repository for these cases, and so the scale of fraud is hard to determine, but a 2017 estimate by the National Fraud Authority put the number lost to local government procurement fraud between 2013 and 2016 at £4.4 billion.

Failures to effectively monitor government contracts, and related failures to take enforcement action against procurement fraud, is no doubt costing the government billions in spending on contracts where suppliers may be overcharging or providing poor quality goods and services.

US

Most procurement enforcement actions in the US are handled through the False Claims Act (FCA), which was enacted in 1863 as a way to hold dishonest contractors accountable during the Civil War. The FCA made it illegal for individuals or companies to submit false or fraudulent claims for payment to the government and included a provision on whistleblowing. Today, a large portion of FCA cases result from whistleblower revelations.

Of the few thousand government contracting violations contained in Violation Tracker, not quite half (42 percent) of cases are attributed to large companies linked to a parent. This group, however, accounts for 85 percent of the total penalty amount, and has an average penalty eight times that of smaller companies.

The FCA is enforced heavily in the healthcare industry in regard to Medicare and Medicaid services. Eight out of the top ten penalized companies for FCA violations are healthcare or pharmaceutical companies. Many of these cases cover allegations of kickbacks (a form of bribery) to physicians to promote the use of their products. Biogen Inc., based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, settled one such case in 2022 and will pay $900 million in penalties.

The Justice Department (DOJ) is the primary federal prosecutor for the FCA. It has prosecuted over 800 cases of government fraud since 2010, with nearly $26 billion in penalties. The largest settlement to date of $1.2 billion occurred in 2016 against Wells Fargo for mortgage fraud claims when the company misrepresented insurance eligibility for residential home mortgage loans, resulting in the government having to pay those insurance claims on defaulted loans. In total, federal prosecutors have resolved 2,100 government contracting cases totalling $32 billion in penalties.

State Attorneys General (AG) do the brunt of enforcement at the state level. Many of the largest cases are overseen by multiple state AGs working in concert against nationwide companies that may be defrauding multiple levels of government. For Medicare and Medicaid fraud, it is common for a company to violate both federal and state statutes since the two programs are regulated at different government levels. In 2017, Mylan Inc. agreed to pay $465 million to both the DOJ and multistate AGs for knowingly underpaying rebates owed to Medicaid for EpiPens dispersed to patients. State and local prosecutors across the country have penalized offenders nearly $6 billion in total.

Government contracting offenses can also be resolved through private litigation, usually in cases filed by whistleblowers. In most instances the Justice Department will intervene in the matter. When those cases are successful, they are announced by the DOJ and are included in the False Claims Act statistics above. Occasionally, DOJ will decline to intervene and the whistleblower pursues the cases independently. In 2022, for example, Massachusetts General Hospital settled for $14.6 million to resolve a whistleblower lawsuit alleging its orthopaedic surgeons engaged in overlapping surgeries in violation of Medicare and Medicaid rules.

The new Procurement Act in the UK has been brought in on the promise of further transparency and better management of public contracts, but it remains to be seen whether this will be enough to guard against procurement fraud, with some arguing that key opportunities to include anti-fraud measures were missed. The vast sums clawed back in the US as a result of government contracting offences suggests that the UK public is missing out on millions if not billions that has been fraudulently obtained from the public sector.

Price-Fixing and Anti-Competitive Practices

When companies collude with each other to limit competition, especially if these companies enjoy a significant share of the market, they are in breach of competition law. In the UK, companies are subject to the Competition Act 1998.

In the US, The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 outlawed practices impeding competition, including the formation of monopolies and conspiring to constrain trade. Price-fixing cases were rare until a major scandal in the 1960s involving electrical equipment companies, which was the first time big-business executives were jailed for antitrust violations. Over the following decades, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Justice Department ramped up its activities, and in turn drove follow-on private litigation in which plaintiffs were able to use the evidence brought to light in the federal cases to get companies to pay substantial monetary settlements.

A population-adjusted comparison of penalties issued by US vs UK regulators for price-fixing and anti-competitive practices since 2010 reveals that the US total is five times higher than the UK.

UK

Since 2010, the UK government has received around £1 billion in fines for price-fixing and anti-competitive practices. The great majority of this total comes from investigations led by the primary competition regulator – the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), and before them the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). Markets dominated by fewer, larger companies are also regulated by sectoral agencies which have powers concurrent with the CMA. There are eight such agencies: The Office of Communications (Ofcom), The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) and the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation (NIAUR), The Payment Systems Regulator (PSR), the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) and the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat).

While fines issued by the CMA have increased over this period, there are still a significant number of cases where companies engaged in anti-competitive practices face only small penalties, or none at all.

The CMA and OFT have concluded almost 100 cases under the Competition Act 1998 since 2010, and issued approximately 126 monetary penalties. Total penalties issued by the CMA have increased from between £1 – £36 million recovered each year between 2015 and 2019, £71 million – £186 million between 2020 and 2022 and the highest total penalties yet of £196 million in 2023. This is in large part due to record fines levied against suppliers of medicines to the NHS, including £130 million paid by Auden Mckenzie and Actavis UK for the abuse of a dominant market position to overcharge for hydrocortisone tablets in 2023, £70 million for Pfizer and Flynn for excessive pricing of a life-saving epilepsy drug in 2022 and over £100 million paid by Advanz, Cinven and HgCapital for the overpricing of liothyronine tablets in 2021.

Whilst total penalties issued by the CMA are rising, there are still a great number of cases that end in no penalty and no liability. This means an investigation into suspected anti-competitive practices is closed after the regulator accepts ‘commitments’ from the parties involved; in other words, the company suspected of anti-competitive practices makes assurances to the agency that it will abide by regulations.

This is particularly the case when it comes to enforcement action undertaken by industry-specific regulators. The Payment Systems Regulator for instance has only issued seven monetary penalties since it was established in 2015. Ofgem has only issued penalties in one competition case: an anti-competitive agreement between Economy Energy, E (Gas and Electricity) Limited and Dyball Associates resulting in fines of £870,000. The Financial Conduct Authority has also imposed fines in only one competition case for which it issued £150,000 in penalties.

These two cases were against smaller companies and the penalties were low. Penalties are usually calculated as up to 30% of the annual turnover in the relevant market in the year preceding the conclusion of the offence, multiplied by the number of years the offence took place and then are subject to a number of adjustments both up and down for aggravated and mitigating circumstances.

Whilst 30% of annual turnover seems high, the fine can be miniscule in comparison to the worldwide turnover of the companies involved. The Payment Systems Regulator’s biggest case, an investigation into a cartel in the prepaid card services sector, was concluded in 2022 and resulted in fines of £33 million. The bulk of this was paid by Mastercard, calculated as 23% of its turnover in the relative market, multiplied by the six years the anti-competitive agreement was in place and then subject to adjustments. The final fine to Mastercard was roughly equivalent to its turnover in that market in one year, however it only represented a fraction of what the company took home in its worldwide turnover.

Some regulators have only used their powers to enforce prohibitions specified in the Competitions Act 1998 to accept commitments. The CAA, ORR and Ofwat have not issued any penalties in the period since 2010. Ofwat has required commitments from Thames Water, Bristol Water and Severn Trent in relation to allegations that the firms were abusing their dominant market positions. Similarly the ORR has had one case involving a company since 2010, accepting commitments from Freightliner, after an investigation into allegations that the firm had also abused its position in the provision of deep sea container rail transport services.

Leniency agreements also allow for companies to pay no penalties at all. In 2019 Ofcom found that the Royal Mail and The Salegroup Limited had entered into a cartel agreement but the Royal Mail paid no penalty for its involvement, having been granted immunity for its cooperation with the investigation. In December 2016 the CAA found that­ Manchester Airport Group and Prestige Parking Ltd had been engaged in price-fixing by setting minimum prices for airport parking. Despite calculating the penalty at £12 million and £974,000 respectively (starting point 30% of annual turnover multiplied by period of the offence), these were both reduced to £0 after a leniency discount was applied.

Whilst the CMA has increased the size of fines it is handing to companies for breaking competition law, there are still many instances where breaches of the Competition Act have gone largely unpunished. Fines are often low, and in roughly a third of cases no financial penalty is issued.  Only 38% of the sanctions for price-fixing and anti-competitive practices were tied to a parent company on Violation Tracker UK, suggesting that larger corporations are less likely to face enforcement action.

US

Since 2010, US companies have paid $70 billion in fines and settlements to resolve allegations of price-fixing and related anti-competitive practices in violation of antitrust laws. Banks, credit card companies and investment firms are the worst violators, but nearly every company in the financial services and pharmaceutical industries has been a defendant in at least one case. Nearly three-quarters of companies with anti-competitive penalties belong to a parent, which is substantially higher than Violation Tracker’s rate of 20 percent across all industries.

The primary enforcer is the Antitrust Division. The Federal Trade Commission is responsible for enforcing other antitrust laws such as the Clayton Act. Federal regulators and prosecutors have brought over 160 successful price-fixing cases against companies since 2010, with $9 billion in penalties.

States are also vigilant in enforcement. Attorneys general, acting either individually or jointly in multistate actions, brought cases against a variety of companies and industries. In some instances, state AGs have worked together with federal prosecutors. Bank of America, for example, resolved both multistate and federal litigation concerning bid rigging, price fixing, and other anti-competitive municipal bond practices that defrauded state agencies, local government, and non-profits. The settlement totalled nearly $140 million at both levels of government. State regulators alone have handed out nearly $7 billion in penalties.

Price-fixing lawsuits may also be brought by private parties. Violation Tracker US contains nearly 1,200 class action lawsuits totalling $41 billion in penalties. In 2019, Visa and Mastercard agreed to a $6.2 billion combined settlement for allegations of collusion to raise the swipe fees paid by merchants. Another settlement reached in 2024 will reduce those fees by an estimated $30 billion over the next five years.

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 made it possible in the UK to bring collective legal actions under the Competition Act on an opt-out basis, meaning we may soon see companies who break competition law paying out substantial figures to customers at Competition Appeal Tribunals.

Even with the removal of private litigation cases and adjusted by population size to compare directly with the UK, US regulators have issued £5.8 billion in fines since 2010. This is more than five times the total penalty amount of UK regulators.

Given sanctions are tied to turnover, this could in part be explained by the fact that around two-thirds of enforcement action has been taken against smaller companies in the UK, as opposed to around a quarter in the US.

Environment

There are four key agencies responsible for environmental regulation and protection throughout the devolved nations of the UK. These are the Environment Agency (EA), Natural Resources Wales (NRW), the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) and the Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA). Collectively, these agencies have issued £361 million in published fines since 2010. Councils are responsible for regulating some environmental offences such as fly-tipping.

In the US, environmental enforcement is shared between the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state regulatory agencies. With state-level and private litigation figures included, $100 billion in penalties has been issued since 2010 for environmental offences.

Weighted by population size and with private litigation cases excluded, the amount issued in fines by US regulators for environmental offences totals £16.9 billion compared to the UK’s £361 million. The US additionally enforces against a broader range of environmental offences. Both countries are more likely to fine smaller companies than larger ones.

UK

The highest fines for environmental offences in the UK are issued by the EA. Since 2010, the EA have concluded almost 7,000 cases totalling £353 million in fines. Far fewer fines have been handed out by NRW, NIEA and SEPA. Our Freedom of Information requests reveal that out of NRW’s 803 enforcement cases between 2020 and 2023, only 2.6% have resulted in a monetary fine. Meanwhile since 2010, Violation Tracker UK data reveals that NIEA have issued total fines of only £627,000.

Whilst the EA issues far higher fines than its regional counterparts, its enforcement cases have been in a constant and steady decline year on year since 2010, with an 88% decrease in overall enforcement actions between 2010 and 2023. Like the EA, SEPA has seen overall enforcement actions decrease by almost a third since 2010. Warnings and enforcement notices issued by the agency have seen a 70% decline from 177 in 2010 to 47 in 2022. Declines have also been seen in cases referred to the Procurator Fiscal (PF), the body in Scotland to whom SEPA refers cases for prosecution. In 2010, there were 37 cases referred to the PF, in 2022 this had declined to one.

A 50% cut in funding to the Environment Agency is likely to be a major contributing factor to this decline. It may in part also be attributable to the legacy of the Hampton Review; ideas that rested on the notion that companies could be trusted to be compliant. Subsequent policy that followed the EA’s ‘21st Century Approach to Regulation’ report of 2006, enshrined negotiated agreements and self-assessment ideas into practice. The operator self-monitoring system, for instance, which was extended to the water industry in 2010, requires that polluting industries self-report their volume of discharge. A Guardian investigation last year found that since 2010 36% of Environment Agency audits that should have taken place to monitor whether self-reporting systems were accurate were missing.

Smaller fines are linked to the size of company facing enforcement action. All four environment agencies are more likely to bring cases against small and medium sized enterprises. Only 26% of entries tagged as environmental offences on Violation Tracker UK are tied to a parent company.

The water industry is more likely than any other to receive high penalties from the Environment Agency. This includes its biggest fine of £90m, which was handed to Southern Water in 2021 for deliberate and repeated dumping of raw sewage into the seas off North Kent and Hampshire between 2010 and 2015. Almost a quarter of the concluded enforcement actions by NRW recorded by Violation Tracker UK have been against Dwr Cymru, the main water services provider in Wales. Since 2018, not-for-profit Dwr Cyrmu have received over 200 warnings, but only 2 fines. Meanwhile 22% of NIEA penalties have been issued against Northern Ireland Water Limited since 2010 and 28 cases have been concluded by SEPA against Scottish Water, adding up to £584,000 in total penalties for both companies combined.

US

Environmental enforcement in the United States grew out of the conservation movement of the early 20th century. The initial expectation was that state governments would take the lead, but when they failed to take an aggressive approach there were growing calls for the federal government to step in.

That is what happened in the 1960s with the passage of several laws dealing with water and air quality. Federal involvement was firmly established with the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 followed by the passage of the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act. These laws gave the EPA primary responsibility for meeting anti-pollution goals but allowed it to delegate enforcement authority to state agencies. When states were enthusiastic about the task this arrangement worked well; when they weren’t it led to wide disparities in enforcement in different parts of the country.

Violation Tracker contains nearly 50,000 entries on environmental cases dating back to 2010. About one-quarter were handled by the EPA. Violation Tracker draws data from EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) database as well as agency press releases and several other sources. A smaller number of federal environmental cases are obtained from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, which covers offshore oil and gas drilling, and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.

Two-thirds of the environmental entries come from state regulatory agencies, which share responsibility with the EPA for enforcement of federal laws such as the Clean Air Act while also bringing cases under state laws.

In some states, environmental enforcement is also handled through state attorneys general or local prosecutors. A multistate attorneys general case against BP resulted in a $4.9 billion penalty to resolve claims due to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. There are also some local regulatory agencies, such as the Louisville Metro Air Pollution Control District in Kentucky or the South Coast Air Quality Management District in California, which has resolved over one thousand cases.

Violation Tracker also contains selected private litigation since 2010, including over 80 major environmental class action and multi-district lawsuits with total settlements and awards of $16 billion.

Thirty percent of cases tagged as environmental offences are linked to a parent company, meaning roughly a third of penalties are issued to large corporations.

With parent companies tagged by industry it is possible to determine that oil and gas parent companies received the highest and the most numerous fines for environmental offences, with utilities and power generation companies, which include water companies, accounting for five times fewer cases and only $5 billion in fines as opposed to $43 billion.

Environmental enforcement in the US results in vastly higher fines than the UK, where total penalties are 2% of the US total. US environmental enforcement also covers a greater range of offences. Oil and gas companies rarely face enforcement action for environmental offences in the UK, whilst they represent the highest number of parent companies fined for environment violations in the US.

Conclusion

Across all four areas of corporate misconduct examined, the US has a stronger record of enforcement.

With a central federal agency handling most wage and hour violations, and state/local agencies handling many others, many workers subjected to wage theft by an employer can benefit from a government investigation. In the UK, the regulator only deals in cases of non-payment of minimum wage, with individual workers required to take an employer to tribunal if their wages have been unfairly deducted. Plans to create a single-enforcement body for employment rights has been shelved, leaving the regulation of labour rights highly fragmented. Collective action lawsuits are more advanced in the US, for both workers seeking redress and consumers claiming compensation.

When it comes to government contracting, thousands of cases of corporate fraud are prosecuted under the US’ False Claims Act. In the UK, there is a lack of monitoring, meaning that procurement fraud is going largely undetected and unprosecuted.

Fines are increasing for companies who break competition law in the UK, but they still lag behind the US. Smaller companies are more likely to be targeted for enforcement action, and many cases still end with no monetary penalty issued.

The same pattern of small companies and small penalties can be observed with environmental enforcement, which shows signs of decline across the four devolved nations. In the UK, enforcement bodies are highly focused on water pollution and waste offences, whilst the US additionally prosecutes companies for a wide variety of environmental offences.

Across different industries, the US surpasses the UK in enforcement for several reasons. While US states tend to have fractured operations, US federal agencies create a standard that is applied broadly across the country which every local, state, or federal jurisdiction should adhere to. When it comes to labour market enforcement the adoption of a cohesive regulatory body in the UK would help to address widespread non-compliance and remove pressure from individual workers who take this responsibility on instead.

The US has also been successful in targeting larger companies and imposing higher fines, both in agency enforcement actions and private litigation. The UK should consider raising the floor for penalty amounts to further ensure compliance and lessen recidivism. Going after bigger companies with large money reserves takes more governmental resources, but these cases serve as deterrents for others that are flying under the radar.

As we continue to see the same companies commit offences repeatedly with minimal consequences, it is becoming more and more difficult to defend responsive regulation. While the US approach to enforcement is far from perfect, the UK’s regulatory laws and culture need to catch up with corporations that have learned to exploit a mismanaged system.

[1] Penalties for not paying minimum wage are not reported. HMRC reported recovering £13.7 million in arrears in their 2022-2023 Annual Report, suggesting that not all cases are published and therefore do not show up as entries on Violation Tracker UK.

A Perilous Gap-Government Regulatory Enforcement in the United Kingdom vs the United States

Contact:
Maia Kirby maia@goodjobsfirst.org

Siobhan Standaert [email protected]

Bratton, Wiltshire, UK – An Environment Agency Van in England. Source: Shutterstock

London, England and Washington, DCRegulators in the United Kingdom are falling short when it comes to holding wrong-doing companies accountable for their actions. Enforcement in key areas such as the labour standards, competition, government procurement oversight and the environment has weakened, especially in comparison to the United States.

Total penalties issued by US regulators since 2010 are substantially higher than those issued by their counterparts in the UK, where a ‘warning’ is usually all a company receives.

Those are the bottom-line findings of an analysis of the regulatory landscape as detailed by a comparison of the fines, fees, penalties, settlements, and warnings issued by regulators in the United States and in the United Kingdom.

The analysis was done by Good Jobs First, a non-governmental organization that created and maintains two comprehensive databases tracking corporate regulatory infringements, one on each side of the pond.

In Violation Tracker UK, 57% of the entries have no monetary penalties and another 24% have amounts below £5,000. In the US, enforcement actions without monetary penalties are so uncommon that Violation Tracker does not include them and fines below $5,000 are also excluded.

The report, ‘A Perilous Gap: Government Regulatory Enforcement in the United Kingdom vs the United States,’ focuses on four areas of regulation – labour market, government contracting, price-fixing and anti-competitive practices, and the environment.

‘Our research shows the UK is lagging behind the US on enforcement in every area examined. Lack of enforcement of the rules leaves the general public, workers and the environment unprotected from rogue companies, driving down our living standards’,  said Maia Kirby, a UK-based outreach coordinator with Good Jobs First and the report’s lead author.

Among the report’s findings:

  • In the UK, there are far fewer cases against large companies, particularly when it comes to price-fixing.
  • In areas like government contracting, the US has a far more robust system of safeguards against procurement fraud.
  • Private litigation in all areas is more prevalent in the US than in the UK, mainly due to the widespread use of class action lawsuits.
  • When it comes to worker protection, the UK is missing the central enforcing body that exists in the US, the Department of Labor. UK individuals are by and large left to take on rogue employers themselves through the Employment Tribunals.

Since 2010, the UK government has trended toward deregulation and instituted large-scale cuts to agency budgets. One result of these changes is the high number of enforcement actions with small monetary penalties – or none at all.

Regulation in the UK has been highly influenced by the idea of responsive regulation. And if the company falls short, it should be given the chance to improve before receiving monetary penalties.

‘Companies have a long track record of failing to self-regulate’, said Siobhan Standaert, a research analyst with Good Jobs First and one of the report’s authors. ‘Issuing warnings instead of fines doesn’t appear to be improving outcomes.’

The report recommends the UK adopt a cohesive regulatory body to help address widespread labor non-compliance and remove pressure from workers who take this responsibility on instead. The UK should consider also raising the floor for penalty amounts to further ensure compliance and lessen recidivism.

Read the full report.

As part of a big survey of economic development practices in small- and medium-sized cities, we at Good Jobs First recently came upon an exceptional story. Multiple cities and counties in Georgia and South Carolina are cooperating in the Augusta, Ga.-Aiken, S.C. metro area.

They have avoided the ruinous, wasteful “economic war among the states” that we’ve documented in numerous two- and three-state metro areas — where companies move short distances but across a state line and get showered with subsidies as “new job creators” when they have actually just changed employees’ commuting routes. In fact, this is the first functioning interstate cooperation system we have ever encountered.

On left: Will Williams,
President and CEO
Western SC | Economic Development Partnership and Cal Wray, President of the Development Authority of Augusta, Georgia. Contributed photo.

There is only one interstate precedent, sort of: the legally binding deal between the states of Missouri and Kansas, struck in 2019, to not use state dollars for such “interstate job fraud” in the Kansas City metro area. But that agreement doesn’t require cooperation and when Jackson County, Missouri voters recently said “NO!” to a sweetheart stadium deal for the Royals and Chiefs, the governor of Kansas said the deal wouldn’t apply to sports franchises.

To be sure, there are some intrastate cooperation precedents. Our favorites are those, both more than 30 years old, in the Denver and Dayton, Ohio metro areas. In each region, local governments cooperate on growth instead of competing for deals. They even tell on companies that signal an interest in moving around: that is, they tell the company’s incumbent community, to encourage retention if it’s possible.

So we’re delighted to bring you the story from Cal Wray, the president of the Augusta Economic Development Authority, and Will Williams, president and CEO of the Western South Carolina Economic Development Partnership. They answered our questions by email:

Q: How did this cross-border partnership begin?

A: In January 2018, when I was in transitioning jobs from Tennessee to Augusta, Will Williams and I were together in a new national economic development program called The Advanced Economic Development Leadership Program. We completed the program together and along with Robbie Bennett from Columbia County, Georgia (and Jessica Hood from Burke County).* We began to discuss how our offices could work together for the betterment of the region.  With the daily flow of people between our counties for work, shopping, and medical needs it only makes sense for the communities in the MSA to support one another in daily life and in economic development. This allowed us to informally begin working together and helping each other.

*Columbia and Burke Counties, both in Georgia, adjoin the city-county of Augusta. Straddling the Savannah River, five Georgia counties and two in South Carolina make up the Augusta-Richmond County metro area.

Q: How exactly does it work? What happens if an Aiken-area company knocks on Augusta’s door or vice versa?

A: The partnership is informal and works in several ways. We travel together to site selection meetings, trade shows, state and regional association meetings, etc. We work to market the region with joint marketing items, joint meetings, and even joint project visits when companies visit our communities. As it relates to existing industry, we share when companies from one of our respective counties inquiries about locating in an adjacent county; we discuss if this is just moving employees from one location to another, or if the project will create net new jobs.  As a general rule, we would assist companies in information gathering, but if an incentive request was to be made then only net new jobs, not already existing jobs in the region, would be considered by our offices for potential incentives. We as a group want the region to grow and we support each other in those efforts. However, we do not see a benefit in poaching jobs from one of our own communities and partners.

Q: You both must have some turnover among the elected officials to whom you answer. How do you explain this system to a newly elected official who may be skeptical?

A: Both organizations are independent from local governments, but we work in partnership with our local governments. We would explain it exactly as our answer reads in question 2, straight to the point with factual information and the elected officials can ask any questions they deem necessary. Most see a benefit to this relationship and encourage our interactions. To the extent that we have considered more formal arrangements, it would be on the side of the Georgia counties. It is a little more complicated to create a formal relationship when an agreement must cross a state line.

Q: In our own work, we have found some local economic development officials – even in the same state, but in nearby suburbs – to be quite uncooperative and parochial. What message do you have for them?

A: The old saying that a rising tide lifts all boats is true. Communities should work together for the betterment of their regions. It is not always popular when jobs go to an adjacent city or a county, but those jobs do benefit the region and normally lead to more jobs for the entire region. If you can come to terms with that, agree to disagree, then you can see if you can work together on the next project that comes before your communities. I would recommend this approach for most communities and states in close proximity to each other. It is not a competition but a cooperation, so all communities can improve and grow. The success of one leads to the success of the others.

Q: In addition to economic development incentives, what strategies are you using to make your respective communities a place where employers want to locate and grow?

A: Incentives are well down on the list of focus items. We would always say incentives don’t win a project. They will only fill gaps at the end. We focus on workforce, existing industry, community livability, sites and buildings, and overall impact of a business. We focus on what drives our interest in a project, but also why that business should be interested in our region. It is a full story. Each of the mentioned components plays a vital role in deciding if our community is the right place for the project and if the project is right for our communities and our region.

Read more interviews:

5 Questions with Branden Butler: Hitting Wage Thieves Where It Hurts

5 Questions With Ike Brannon: Amazon’s Missing Economic Influence

5 Questions With Dave Wells: Tempe, Arizona Voters Reject NHL Arena Subsidy

5 Questions with Bridget Fisher: New York Penn Station’s TIF Problem

5 Questions with Jane Vancil: Auto-tracking subsidy outcomes

5 Questions With Ioana Marinescu: Low-Wage Earners Face Harsher Working Conditions

5 Questions with Tom Speaker: New York Breaks Up With Opportunity Zones

5 Questions with Joel Bakan: Ending Corporations’ Stranglehold on Society

5 Questions with Michelle Dillingham: Cincinnati’s TIF Crusader

5 questions with Patricia Todd: Alabama’s Transparency Problem

5 questions with David Wessel: Opportunity Zones, a Rich Man’s Game

5 Questions with Jonas Heese: When Newspapers Close, Corporate Misconduct Goes Up

5 Questions with Dorothy Brown: Federal loan forgiveness a good start

5 Questions with Sarah Austin: A Tax Avoidance Strategy Big Box Retailers Love

5 Questions with Joshua Jansa: Economic Development Subsidies Concentrate Wealth Upwards

 

Center for Media and Democracy: Railroad Owned by RFK Jr.’s Megadonor Repeatedly Violated Environmental and Safety Laws

Two male hands in suits are shaking hands. In the background, the sun is setting over high-rise buildings.
Source: Khwanchai Phanthong

The Center for Media and Democracy used Violation Tracker to help tell a story of a wealthy railroad owner lavishly supporting two presidential campaigns. Timothy Mellon is the third biggest donor so far this election cycle, CMD reports.

“Robert F. Kennedy Jr. may claim he will be “the best environmental president in American history,” but the Republican industrialist bankrolling the super PAC behind his longshot bid for the White House has a long history of violating environmental laws.

A Center for Media and Democracy (CMD) study of the railroad business that 81-year-old megadonor Timothy Mellon owned for 45 years shows numerous violations of federal and state environmental and safety laws, including a criminal conviction of the company for covering up a 2006 oil spill.”

Read the full story at the Center for Media and Democracy.

Investigative Post: IDAs have ‘perverse incentive’ to issue tax breaks

The Investigative Post wrote a detailed story based in part on a recent Good Jobs First, Perverse Incentive: How New York State’s IDAs Depend on Giving Away Tax Dollars.” The Post wrote about the relationship between funding and Industrial Development Agencies, the unelected boards with power to give away billions in taxpayer dollars to private developments.

From the story:

The so-called “perverse incentive” works like this: A company fills out an application, and then pays the IDA a percentage of its project’s total cost — typically 1 or 2 percent, as set by the individual agencies. The $550 million Amazon warehouse in the Town of Niagara, for example, netted the Niagara County IDA a $5.5 million fee. That alone could keep the IDA open for three years.

In addition to fees, IDAs earn money through grants, charging rent on buildings or industrial parks they own, and land sales.

“It turns out we set up a system where IDAs get paid for good deals and they get paid for bad deals, but they have to do some deals in order to keep open,” said state Sen. Sean Ryan, a frequent IDA critic. “And that’s a real bad incentive system.”

Read the full story at the Investigative Post.

The North Sea as seen from an aerial image.
Source: Getty Images Signature

Last year, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced that the UK government will be granting hundreds of new oil and gas licences in the North Sea. This decision was framed as a means to protect jobs, reduce emissions, and enhance UK energy independence and security. However, the move to expand oil and gas extraction contradicts the UK government’s commitment to achieving net zero emissions by 2050. The North Sea Transition Authority (‘NSTA’) (formerly the Oil and Gas Authority) is the agency responsible for granting new oil and gas licences. Alongside this, the NSTA also regulates and influences the oil and gas, offshore hydrogen, and carbon storage industries. It is involved in driving the North Sea energy transition, which sits in direct contradiction to their ability to grant new licences.

This blog delves into the core objectives of the NSTA, examines enforcement data, and explores the potential for reform.

The North Sea Transition Authority: Core Objectives

NSTA’s core objective is to achieve the maximum economic recovery (‘MER’) of UK petroleum, as set out in section 9a of the Petroleum Act 1998. This objective is to be met through the ‘development, construction, deployment and use of equipment used in the petroleum industry’, thereby encouraging the NSTA to support oil and gas extraction. However, this objective stands in direct conflict with the urgent need to mitigate climate change. The continued extraction and burning of fossil fuels, including oil from the North Sea, are significant contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, driving climate change and exacerbating its impacts. By prioritising MER, the NSTA risks perpetuating reliance on fossil fuels and delaying the UK’s transition to renewable energy alternatives. Similarly, within their strategy, the NSTA does not state any provisions or mandate to promote renewable energy.

In 2021, in line with section 9a(1) of the Petroleum Act, a revised energy strategy was produced by the Oil and Gas Authority supporting the net zero strategy, stating that oil and gas companies should ‘maintain good environmental, social and governance practices in their plans and daily operations’. However, even in the face of this revised strategy, the MER of UK petroleum remained a central objective. A year later, the Oil and Gas Authority’s name was changed to the NSTA, with ‘transition’ being carefully added. This change was explained as reflecting the expanding role of the NSTA in the future of energy in the UK. However, Caroline Lucas has criticised this change, stating “an oil and gas body removing the words ‘oil and gas’ from its own name is the very epitome of greenwashing”.

Therefore, after this revised strategy, the NSTA has a responsibility to align the industry with transition, emissions reduction, and decarbonisation, while having the authority to grant new licences for oil and gas exploration. This alignment poses a contradiction for the NSTA, meaning that it faces a critical dilemma between helping with the energy transition while also helping fossil fuel expansion. As was stated earlier, licensing for oil and gas has been ramped up in the last year and shows no signs of slowing down. However, in comparison, the enforcement record of the NSTA is much lower, with only seven cases since 2021 resulting in fines totalling £525,000. Of these seven cases, Shell and BP have both been fined £50,000 each for an oil drilling violation. Therefore, looking at these numbers, it can be seen where the priorities lie for the NSTA, and it is not with regulating the fossil fuel industry.

Reforming the Petroleum Act

While MER stands as the core objective of the NSTA, enforcement action against fossil fuel corporations will be low and granting new oil and gas licences will be the priority. Therefore, the Petroleum Act 1998 that sits at the heart of the NSTA needs reforming. This reform would provide an opportunity to completely rethink what we want the North Sea to be used for: exploitation of oil and gas reserves or the mobilisation of renewable energy technology. It has been suggested that there could be a reversal of ‘maximising’ to ‘minimising’ of economic recovery, or replacing ‘economic’ with environmental recovery. However, even this would still allow too much subjective interpretation.

Removing MER rather than reforming or changing its meaning may need to be considered. This would potentially open the door to the NSTA being able to place greater emphasis on environmental protections, enabling stricter regulations of fossil fuel corporations. Whatever form this may take, a radical reform of the Petroleum Act and therefore the core objectives of the NSTA is needed if the UK is going to fully align with their 2050 net zero target.

Mirror Indy | Indy Star: Brad Chambers’ company received ‘bailout’ from Indy after missing loan repayment deadline 

Indiana gubernatorial candidate Brad Chambers, the founder and CEO of Buckingham Companies, has twice missed paying back loans for a project he built that included luxury housing. According to Mirror Indy and the Indy Star, Chambers’ company owes Indianapolis residents $69 million.

From the article:

This was an exceptionally generous incentive deal,” Greg LeRoy, executive director of Washington, D.C.-based economic development accountability group Good Jobs First, told IndyStar and Mirror Indy this week. “This is not gap financing. … That should give the government a great deal of authority in enforcing the terms.”

Read the full story at Mirror Indy.

Commonwealth Journal: For-profit nursing homes are cutting corners on safety and draining resources

image shows the hands of an elderly woman putting her hand on her knee
pixabay

An investigation by The Conversation into nursing homes found disturbing trends among owners of nursing homes. The industry is increasingly led by owners that appear to be focused on profits over patient safety, and ownership can be difficult to trace. The Conversation cited Good Jobs First’s recent report on the topic:

“The investigation revealed an industry that places a premium on cost cutting and big profits, with low staffing and poor quality, often to the detriment of patient well-being. Operating under weak and poorly enforced regulations with financially insignificant penalties, the for-profit sector fosters an environment where corners are frequently cut, compromising the quality of care and endangering patient health. Meanwhile, owners make the facilities look less profitable by siphoning money from the homes through byzantine networks of interconnected corporations. Federal regulators have neglected the problem as each year likely billions of dollars are funneled out of nursing homes through related parties and into owners’ pockets.

“With few impediments, private investors who own the midsize chains have quietly swooped in to purchase underperforming homes, expanding their holdings even further as larger chains divest and close facilities. As a result of the industry’s churn of facility ownership, over one fifth of the country’s nursing facilities changed ownership between 2016 and 2021, four times more changes than hospitals.

A 2023 report by Good Jobs First, a nonprofit watchdog, noted that a dozen of these chains in the midsize range have doubled or tripled in size while racking up fines averaging over $100,000 per facility since 2018. But unlike the large, multistate chains with easily recognizable names, the midsize networks slip through without the same level of public scrutiny, The Conversation’s investigations unit found.”

Read the full story in the Commonwealth Journal.

Read our report, “Care At Risk: Upheaval in the Nursing Home Industry.”

Executive Summary

Industrial Development Agencies (IDAs), New York State’s unelected local economic development agencies, have a perverse incentive to give away tax revenue that would otherwise go to schools, parks, and emergency services. IDAs get the bulk of their funding from the deal fees they receive from giving away local school, city, and county revenues in the form of corporate tax abatements. Simply put, IDA staff and consultants get paid for giving away tax dollars.

More abatement deals — and bigger deals — mean more revenues for IDAs. Given that most IDA revenues in turn go to pay IDA staff salaries and benefits plus their consultants, IDA employees have personal self-interests in generating more deal-driven fees.

We analyzed state and IDA data and found:

  • New York’s 107 currently active local IDAs got at least 80% of their overall operating revenues from transaction fees from 2018 to 2021.
  • In 2021, one-third of IDAs got 100% of their operating revenue from transaction fees. More than two-thirds received over 80% of their operating budget from deal fees.
  • IDAs that abate more taxes get more fees.

In 2021 alone, tax abatements cost NYS school districts a staggering $1.8 billion1. This figure includes tax abatements given by IDAs along with other local abatement programs.

The bottom line is that IDA staff have a strong institutional and personal incentive to give away more tax dollars as corporate tax abatements instead of having these tax dollars spent on investments in schools, safety and health that are essential for strong local economies.

This perverse incentive motivates IDAs to constantly make new deals and expand their activity. Right now in the upside down world of New York, IDAs are seeking to expand beyond providing tax breaks for industrial projects to abating the taxes on housing development. This is a terrible idea that will reduce the local tax base and funding available for schools while attracting more students.

We conclude with the following policy recommendations:

  1. Eliminate the perverse incentive by funding IDAs within local governments budgets.
  2. Forbid IDAs from abating the roughly 60% share of property taxes that would otherwise go to schools.
  3. Confirm the state constitutional prohibition on IDAs subsidizing housing.

On balance, we believe New York should take a hard look at IDAs and question why so much power is being delegated to unelected officials whose activities take place outside of the constitutional budget process and whose salaries depend upon giving away tax revenue.

Key Findings

IDAs budgets are driven by the size and number of the deals that they award, because a large portion of their budgets are based upon the transaction fees they collect from each project. The New York State Authorities Budget Office (ABO), the office tasked with making public authorities more accountable and transparent, labels these deal fees as “charges for services.” They are “generated from the services provided by the authority,” and can include bond-issuance fees, ongoing project-administrative fees, usage charges, toll collections, etc.2

Essentially, these fees are money that businesses pay to the IDA in exchange for enabling the tax breaks. They are not the same as Payments in Lieu of Taxes, or PILOTs, which are offsetting or “make up” payments which go to the local government, not to the IDA.

As Table 1 details, in total over the past five years, 80% of all the IDAs’ operating revenues came from these deal fees. The largest dollar amount of fees came in 2021, when more than $81 million was collected. The highest share was in 2022, when almost 85% of overall IDA revenues came from fees.

Table 1: IDA Share of IDA Revenues from Deal Fees, 2018 2022

 

 

Year

 

Deal Fees

Total Operating Revenue Total

Non-Operating Revenue

% of Operating Revenue from Fees % of Total Revenue from Fees
2018 $53,548,449 $69,602,841 $29,208,540 76.9% 54.2%
2019 $45,409,182 $56,963,720 $19,824,470 79.7% 59.1%
2020 $41,127,521 $56,005,869 $16,553,689 73.4% 56.7%
2021 $81,612,629 $99,243,706 $33,120,282 82.2% 61.6%
2022 $67,538,030 $79,669,654 $39,846,421 84.8% 56.5%
Total $289,235,811 $361,485,791 $138,553,402 80.0% 57.8%

 

Deal fees make up more than half of IDA’s total revenue. This total revenue includes non-operating revenue, such as subsidies/grants, which are irregular sources of income. These are often short-term or one-time payments, such as federal American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) money, that is sporadic and does not come from core operations. The ABO makes this distinction in its guidance to IDAs for their financial reporting (see Appendix D: Data Dictionary and Appendix B for 2021 example). Operating revenue is generally considered a better indicator of an entity’s financial health.

Read the rest of the key findings and report here.

 

Logos are of Reinvent Albany, which features the shape of New York State and Good Jobs First.

Contacts:

Ron Deutsch, Senior Policy Fellow, Reinvent Albany, [email protected] or 518-469-6769
Greg LeRoy, Executive Director, Good Jobs First, [email protected] or 202-494-0888

Albany, N.Y. – Deal fees generate 80% of the operating budgets of New York’s 107 Industrial Development Agencies (IDAs), and for a third of IDAs, transaction fees account for 100% of their operating income. But for such fees, most IDAs would expire or barely exist.

IDAs in turn spend most of that revenue on their staff salaries and benefits, and on consultants.

The more tax revenue an IDA abates, the more dependent it is likely to be on deal fees for its operating income.

Those are key findings in “Perverse Incentive: How New York State’s IDAs Depend on Giving Away Tax Dollars,” a report published today by Reinvent Albany and national watchdog Good Jobs First. It concludes that IDAs have a perverse incentive to give away tax revenue that would otherwise support schools, parks, and emergency services.

The findings come from a close analysis of IDA-reported data to the state Authorities Budget Office.

The costs are enormous: In 2021 alone, tax abatements – mostly awarded by IDAs – cost NYS school districts a staggering $1.8 billion.

The report finds that because IDA staff and consultants have a direct interest in making new tax break deals, IDAs are motivated to do more and bigger deals and expand beyond their legal mission of promoting “industry.” Some New York IDAs are ignoring the state Constitution and abating taxes on housing development.

The report includes policy recommendations:

  • Eliminate the perverse incentive to give away tax revenue by funding IDAs within local government budgets.
  • Forbid IDAs from abating property taxes that would otherwise go to schools.
  • Confirm the state constitutional prohibition on IDAs subsidizing housing.

“Watchdog groups have been sounding the alarm for years on IDA problems. New York should take a hard look at IDAs and question why so much power is being delegated to unelected officials whose activities take place outside of the constitutional budget process and whose staff salaries depend upon giving away tax revenue,” said Ron Deutsch, Senior Policy Fellow at Reinvent Albany.

“The power to abate taxes should always reside with people who can be held accountable at election time,” said Greg LeRoy, Executive Director of Good Jobs First. “And people negotiating tax abatements should never have an institutional or personal self-interest in undermining the tax base for basic public services that benefit all employers.”

“Not all of New York’s IDAs are unscrupulous, but the way they are funded opens the door to bad actors interested only in enriching themselves at the expense of our communities. This perverse incentive has been evident for years, but this new research lays bare how dangerous and pervasive it could be. This is why I have spent years pushing for – and continue to push for – policy changes to ensure critical funding is never withheld from schools or other public programs to fund projects that will provide no tangible benefit to their communities,” said New York State Sen. Sean Ryan.

Baltimore Banner: Taxpayers sank almost $100 million into a COVID glove factory that never opened

The promises echoed into a massive warehouse once used by Bethlehem Steel: $350 million in public and private investment, 2,000 new jobs and the return of manufacturing to Sparrows Point within a year.

A piece of blue surgical gloves.
A piece of blue surgical gloves. Source: Getty Images

It was March 2022, the tail end of the Omicron wave of COVID-19 in the U.S., and a company called United Safety Technology hosted local politicians and federal officials at a groundbreaking of its state-of-the-art nitrile glove factory — jumpstarted by a $96.1 million investment from the federal government.

Two years later, not a single glove has rolled off the line.

The factory sits unfinished, the feds are distancing themselves, and the CEO of the New York-based company says he needs more money…

There might be a better way to do this, said Greg LeRoy, executive director of Good Jobs First, a watchdog organization that researches government subsidies. Rather than focusing on the supply of gloves, LeRoy said, the government could create demand.

That would mean strictly enforcing that federal agencies buy American-made gloves, he said, ensuring a small but steady demand for a domestic industry. To LeRoy, that makes more sense than trying to subsidize a globally competitive manufacturing industry.

“You can’t defy gravity,” LeRoy said. “If you have really cheap imports coming in, I can understand why this strategy didn’t work.”

Read the full story at the Baltimore Banner.

BridgeDetroit: ‘Net loser’: Gilbert’s Hudson building unlikely to meet promised job, tax revenue when GM workers move in

An image of a manhole cover in Detroit.
An image of a manhole cover in Detroit. Source: Getty Images Signature

General Motors Co’s anticipated crosstown move from the Renaissance Center to the nearly complete Hudson’s Detroit building puts a high profile anchor tenant in the skyscraper, owned by Dan Gilbert’s Bedrock. But it also puts Bedrock on pace to miss the job and tax revenue creation promises it made in exchange for a controversial $60 million tax incentive in 2022, a new BridgeDetroit analysis finds.

The potential shortfall casts doubt on the basis for taxpayer support for what will be Detroit’s second tallest skyscraper.

Supporters of the tax break insisted at the time that the Hudson’s site would create 2,000 new jobs and net $71 million in new city tax revenue from the additional workers.

But Detroit will not see a net gain in new jobs or local tax revenue for the estimated 850 GM RenCen employees – it simply moves existing jobs from one building to another, which will not generate new tax revenue for the city…

Hudson’s Detroit is on pace to be a “net loser,” said Greg LeRoy, an economist with subsidy tracker Good Jobs First. He reviewed the tax incentive proposal in 2022, and, at the time, labeled Bedrock’s job creation claims “laughable” because office buildings create very few new jobs. Instead, they largely house jobs that already exist.

City officials “rejected” LeRoy’s comments at the time, and insisted jobs would move from outside the city to the Hudson.

“We never like to say ‘I told you so,’ but office space doesn’t create jobs, especially when it’s office space in a market with high vacancy rates, and tenants that move from three blocks away,” he said. “That’s not economic development.”

Read the full story at BridgeDetroit.