Financial Exposure

Rating the States on Economic Development Transparency



GOOD JOBS FIRST .ORG

APRIL 2022

Financial Exposure

Rating the States on Economic Development Transparency

Kasia Tarczynska, Christine Wen, and Katie Furtado

April 2022
Good Jobs First
Washington, DC
www.goodjobsfirst.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgment

Good Jobs First gratefully acknowledges the support of the Surdna Foundation, which enabled this study.

Features, Figures & Tables

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An evaluation of 250 major state-level economic development programs across all 50 states and the District of Columbia found that 154 of those programs—or 62%—disclose which companies receive public support, while 96 do not. But almost every state knows how to disclose and does so: 48 states plus the District of Columbia—or 96%—provide some degree of recipient disclosure. The gap reflects how inconsistent states are in reporting on all their major programs.

Nevada and Connecticut rate highest on best practices, while Alabama and Georgia score 0. Incredibly, in 2022, they fail to disclose any information whatsoever in a meaningful way.

This is Good Jobs First's sixth transparency "report card" study since 2007, so we can say with great certainty that subsidy recipient transparency has been improving over the years. But it is also true that there is still a lot of room for improvement.

When "Show Us the Subsidized Jobs" was released in 2014, 46 states plus the District of Columbia had some sort of online disclosure. Our 2010 study found recipient disclosure in only 37 states.

The most remarkable improvement over the past eight years is seen in Nevada, where a law enacted in 2015 requires the governor's economic development office to disclose recipient level data for various tax abatements. As a result, Nevada's score in our analyses went from second to last place in 2014 to first place this year.

Other states which made significant improvements in their practices since 2014 include Kansas and South Carolina. States such as Illinois that were previously found to be disclosing well continue to do so.

Then there are states that got worse or stayed bad. Alabama and Georgia declined from 2014, when they had a small amount of transparency, to their 0's today. States with still-minimal disclosure include North Dakota, New Hampshire, Maine, and Delaware.

To be sure, transparency is not the same as effectiveness or accountability. Nor do we have the means here to verify the accuracy of what states post online. But without company-specific, deal-specific disclosure, it's difficult for the public to get at even the most basic return on investment, accountability or equity questions. Which companies are recipients? What kinds of companies are they? How much money did they receive? Are they delivering on the number of jobs promised? Constituents deserve to have answers to these questions. Without them, they cannot have an informed debate and policymakers cannot properly monitor programs or deals.

In this study, we analyze up to five key economic development programs in 50 states and the District of Columbia, for a total of 250. We rate each program based on the inclusion of data such as recipient names, subsidy amount, job, wage, and investment promises and outcomes, project specifics, and pre-approval transparency.

Our key findings:

- Forty-eight (48) states, plus the District of Columbia disclose at least some data on subsidized companies. Overall, states recipient subsidy disclosure has improved since our previous, 2014 study—even on a steeper "grading curve."

- Based on our 100-point scoring system, Nevada (64), Connecticut (52), Illinois (46), Virginia (45), Indiana (45), have the best transparency systems across the major evaluated programs. Only two states scored more than 50% of points.

- Georgia and Alabama have no meaningful disclosure and several states have particularly poor disclosure scores across their major programs, among them are North Dakota (2/100), Maine (2), New Hampshire (3), and Delaware (5). Thirteen (13) states scored fewer than 10 points.

- Out of 250 evaluated programs, 154, or 62%, disclose at least some recipient specific data; 96 programs fail that transparency threshold.

- In adding a new category of "advanced notice and public participation," we found that Nevada, California, Washington, D.C., and Louisiana have the best pre-approval transparency systems by program average. Sixty-nine (69) programs disclose at least some information on public meetings held by boards charged with reviewing the applications. Only 10 of those programs scored perfectly, meaning the public knows when a meeting will take place and has details in advance on deals that will be debated.

- Of the 154 programs with disclosure, 54 disclose both approved and paid out subsidies. Only 15 do not disclose any kind of subsidy amounts, meaning almost all transparent programs we looked at provide some subsidy amount disclosure. However, there is not a single state that provided both awarded and disbursed values for all its programs we examined.

- Only 16 transparent programs in our universe provide full disclosure of enforcement actions, or clawbacks.

- Of the 154 programs with disclosure, 37 disclose both promised and created jobs, making it easy to see if a company delivers on promises to communities, with Connecticut, Illinois, and Nevada receiving perfect scores for all but one of their programs. Sixty-one (61) programs disclose only actual jobs created.

- Only 12 programs got full points for reporting both promised and actual wages. The best performing states are Nevada and Illinois.

- Eight programs got a perfect score for data accessibility, meaning their transparency sites are easy to find, understand, and use. The overall best performing states are Connecticut, Maryland, New York, and Oregon. The least accessible states are North Dakota, New Hampshire, and Utah.

These findings make it clear that state-level economic development transparency continues to grow in the right direction. More states are disclosing subsidy recipients and integrating this data into their online data portals. In 2014, 55% of examined programs disclosed company-specific data, now it is 62%.

But low-performing states and programs show that, nevertheless, there's still lots of room for improvement. In fact, the average score for all states is only 22. This is especially evident when examining scores for subsidy deal outcomes related to wages, jobs, and public engagement.

We recommend that states create comprehensive subsidy transparency portals that are easy to find, understand, and use. At the very least, users should see company names and subsidy amounts for all subsidy programs. Job creation, wage and benefits, and investment promises and outcomes, as well as any penalties imposed for shortfalls, need to be included. States should also practice transparency before a subsidy is approved: all applications (including cost-benefit studies) should be posted on an agency website long before they are subject to final approval to allow for community input and public participation.

FOREWORD BY JASON GARCIA

In the mid-1990s, state lawmakers in Florida created a new tax incentive program that was supposed to help communities struggling with poverty and crime. The program was championed primarily by Black legislators who were trying to attract jobs to some of the most economically disadvantaged areas around the state. But 25 years later, this program meant to help impoverished communities has instead become a continuing subsidy for one of the biggest and richest businesses on the planet: Comcast Corp., the cable giant that owns the Universal Studios theme-park resort in Orlando, Fla.

Public records show that Universal theme parks and hotels have pocketed more than $17 million through Florida's "Urban High Crime Area Jobs Tax Credit"—half of the money ever awarded through the program. Retail giants Walmart Inc. and Publix Supermarkets Inc. have saved more than $1 million each, as well.

Today, some of the lawmakers who fought for this program in the 1990s say it is being abused by a few big corporations and twisted in a way they never intended. And we wouldn't know about any of this if it weren't for transparency laws that allow Florida taxpayers to see exactly how this money is being spent.

It is impossible to overstate how critical transparency is when it comes to evaluating economic development efforts. Across the country, states have created thousands of tax breaks, incentive payments and other economic development programs that transfer public money to private companies in the name of "job creation" or other vague but broadly popular policy goals. But there is no way to know whether any of it is working without transparency.

And right now, we simply don't know enough—not here in Florida, and certainly not around the rest of the country. Even the details about Florida's broken high-crime tax break required a formal public-records request to obtain, when all of the data could, and should, be easily available online.

As the sixth edition of Good Jobs First's transparency "report card" shows, more states around the country are disclosing information about their economic-development programs. But reporting remains sporadic. Too many states still withhold key details about the subsidies they hand out—details like names, amounts, job totals and wage levels. These are basic facts that taxpayers must have in order to evaluate whether economic development programs are truly delivering broad public benefits or simply padding the profits of a few politically influential companies.

Secrecy in economic development ultimately only benefits companies trying to leverage even sweeter deals for themselves at the expense of everyone else. This doesn't just result in wasteful spending. It siphons money away from important public needs, like affordable housing, healthcare, transit and schools. It stifles competition, creativity and growth, by giving one lucky business an unfair economic advantage over its competitors—who are usually smaller businesses that cannot afford to lavish campaign contributions on policymakers or employ teams of lobbyists to woo economic-development officials.

To be sure, transparency alone doesn't ensure accountability or prevent abuses. In Florida, Universal Studios continues to claim high-crime tax breaks because the company has so far successfully lobbied the state Legislature to block any efforts at reform.

But transparency is the crucial first step. Because when it comes to debate over public policy, information is power. And there is currently an information imbalance in favor of the select few companies squeezing subsidies out of states.

Transparency evens the scales—and, ultimately, leads to better outcomes for all.

Jason Garcia is an award-winning journalist based in Florida. For the Orlando Sentinel, he wrote a six-piece series, "Big Profits, Tiny Taxes," that exposed how 99% of Florida companies pay no corporate income taxes. He now writes "Seeking Rents," a newsletter that examines the influences big business has over Florida's public policies.

INTRODUCTION

Transparency of subsidy recipients is the cornerstone of accountable economic development. It enables state residents to know if public officials are managing public financial resources well. People will trust their governments more and will feel respected if a government's actions are transparent. It benefits the economy and society by empowering communities with knowledge and information.

Disclosure of subsidy recipients and performance metrics makes it possible for researchers and advocates to determine whether subsidized companies are doing what they promised to do in exchange for public support. It enables evaluations of programs by administrators to make them more cost-effective. In other words, transparency is essential for building a strong, efficient, and equitable economy. Though necessary to *enable* accountability, transparency by itself is not sufficient. That's where uses of the data come in.

In 2014, after engineering a site location competition between five states, Tesla decided to open an electric car battery factory in Nevada. The state secretly negotiated a deal with the company that gave Tesla over $1 billion in tax-based subsidies. After public outrage over the subsidy cost, state officials promised transparency and accountability and wrote those provisions into the enabling subsidy legislation. The state did in fact deliver on those promises. Various annual and quarterly reports on Tesla's job creation and subsidy payments have been posted on the Nevada Governor's Office of Economic Development website, though not in the most user-friendly format. The public's discomfort with the massive deal pushed the state to improve its subsidy transparency. It's not perfect, but Nevada's post-Tesla reform flipped the state from one of the worst to one of the best in the country.

States subsidize companies in a variety of ways. They offer cash grants, tax credits and exemptions against every tax type, pay for workers' training, and build roads and sewer systems for projects. States subsidize every aspect of a business operation: manufacturing, sales, logistics, operations, research, workforce development, etc.

Some target specific industries like film and TV production, data centers, or natural resource extraction. In exchange, companies agree to create jobs, make capital investments, and (hopefully) generate net new tax revenues. All those subsidy programs come with varying levels of recipient transparency.

This is the sixth 51-state transparency study by Good Jobs First, and the fourth specific to state spending (rather than state disclosure of federal stimulus spending). It differs from the previous three in one important aspect: It acknowledges the importance of transparency *in every step* of the economic development process. In addition to evaluating promises and outcomes, we also examined what company-specific information is available to the public before a subsidy is awarded. We took this approach because public participation matters. Residents have the right to know who will get public funds and for what purposes. They have a right to voice their support or opposition for those projects. But they can only do that if they are provided with the relevant information in advance.

Consider this:

In 2021, Samsung was looking to locate a new chip manufacturing plant. The company first approached Austin, Texas, a hometown of its other long-term projects. Manor School District (in addition to subsidies from the city of Austin and Taylor County) offered the company approximately $253 million in subsidies. The offer triggered criticism from the local community. Despite its large price tag, it was not enough for Samsung: it started scouting other places, both in the region and nationally. Soon, a $314-million property tax abatement offer from Taylor, an Austin exurb, was on the table. A public debate started around whether the level of subsidization was appropriate. Public hearings were held because Texas' property tax abatement program, known as Chapter 313, has robust advance disclosure of proposed deals. Eventually, Samsung did decide to build the facility in Taylor for which it was awarded $1.2 billion from various state and local programs. A few days after the announcement, articles started to appear that New York State had offered about $2 billion in subsidies for the same project. Even though New York had been mentioned as a competitive location, the value of subsidies offered came as a surprise. This is a striking difference between two systems—one where the public has access to information before a deal is done and can therefore voice its concerns, and the other (New York State) where the public is left in the dark until after a deal is done.

Another reason to pay attention to disclosure before subsidies are approved is the proliferation of Non-Disclosure Agreements, or NDAs. These are contracts pushed by site location consultants and their corporate clients that prohibit public officials from disclosing any company information, including the company's name, until a deal is announced or approved, effectively precluding public participation. Recently, the governor of Michigan signed an NDA while working on a billion-dollar subsidy bill. General Motors revealed itself as the recipient only after the deal was done.

Grants and workforce development programs tend to be more transparent than income tax credits, which some states treat as confidential taxpayer information. Transparency can vary from program to program even within one state. This is because subsidies are often managed by different agencies with different regulations or norms regarding public disclosure, and states too often lack comprehensive and wide-reaching subsidy transparency policies. As an example, North Carolina discloses its grant programs in detail, but we found no recipient data on sales tax exemptions for data centers.

Pre-approval transparency also varies among programs and states. Subsidy deals that provide some advance applicant information are those that tend to be approved by boards, which are often required to open their meetings to the public. Beyond agendas with project names, some states, such as Tennessee's Fast Track programs or Louisiana's Quality Jobs, offer the public access to detailed pre-hearing information on subsidy applicants. However, these are exceptions: much more typically, residents only find out how much they will pay for projects after deals are done.

Box 1: How Transparency Moves Policy

By Dick Lavine, Every Texan

Texans opposed to wasteful corporate tax giveaways celebrated an unexpected victory when the Texas Legislature refused to renew the $1-billion-per-year program of school property tax abatements known as "Chapter 313" (after its chapter in the Tax Code). The program had been regularly extended since its creation in 2001, but in 2021 it ran into an onslaught from an unprecedentedly broad-based coalition, bolstered by extensive negative media coverage, that doomed the program.

Key to the success of this campaign—access to detailed information on job creation, wage levels, and costs in lost school revenue.

As 2021 opened, Chapter 313 appeared poised to be extended if not expanded: Corporate interests sought to extend the program for ten years and vastly expand the scope of eligible projects. The projected cost of this bill, as calculated by the Legislative Budget Board using data required to be submitted annually by each project, was an astonishing $46 billion in lost school tax revenue, with an impact through 2049.

The *Texas Observer,* which had been covering the issue for years, led with a story stressing that school districts received little value from these projects after the tax abatement expired.[1]

The *Houston Chronicle,* the largest daily newspaper in Texas, followed with a front-page series that relied on intensive analysis of the information available on each Chapter 313 project—the number of jobs created, the wages paid, the amount invested, and the value of taxes abated—to highlight the excessive cost per job (conservatively estimated at over $200,000), the lack of clawbacks for failure to fulfill job-creation promises, and the almost automatic approval of all applications.[2]

Advocacy groups and community organizations mobilized opposition, inspired by a high-profile joint statement issued by the leading progressive research center where I work, Every Texan, and our influential conservative counterpart, the Texas Public Policy Foundation.[3] The Texas IAF Network, a consortium of grass-roots organizations started by organizers from the Industrial Areas Foundation of Saul Alinsky, devoted its extensive network to combatting extension. Fourteen other high-profile organizations, including the Texas AFL-CIO, the Texas American Federation of Teachers, and the Texas State Teachers Association (an affiliate of the National Education Association or NEA) signed onto a letter calling for an end to Chapter 313. And, on the Right, an outraged Houston Republican precinct chair spread the word widely through his channels while other Libertarian outfits railed against "interference in the free market."

Facing this breadth of opposition, including bipartisan resistance on the House floor, the Legislature adjourned in October without approving the necessary extension of Chapter 313. Applications for the ten-year abatement can be approved through 2022, but no new projects will be accepted after the end of this year.

A surprising second front opened a month later, when the Comptroller proposed a rule that would cut back reporting requirements. **Now the issue was only about future transparency.** The same network that successfully fought renewal had an acute appreciation for the importance of the data collected by the Comptroller in exposing the failures of Chapter 313, so it came back together quickly to submit comments in opposition. The proposed rule was posted the week of Thanksgiving, with comments due the week before Christmas. Despite this diabolical timetable, more than 360 comments were received by the Comptroller. One was in support—from trade groups representing beneficiaries of the tax break—and all the rest were in opposition.

continues

The IAF Network, with its grass-roots membership, was responsible for one-third of the comments. Comments were submitted by The Texas Freedom of Information Foundation, which represents journalists and publishers, by a Republican State Senator who is his party's leader on tax issues, and by a group of 43 Texas House Democrats. Many other responses came from unaffiliated citizens who had followed the *Houston Chronicle* coverage which included a strong editorial against the data cutback[4], or were plugged into conservative networks.

In the face of this universal pushback, the Comptroller was forced to retreat and abandoned his proposal.[5]

Extensive reporting of the costs and meager results of Chapter 313 gave opponents the ammunition needed to successfully kill Texas' largest corporate giveaway. And then, appreciating the importance of continued transparency, they killed a proposal to cut back on the future reporting. These lessons will not be lost when the Legislature, as it surely will, tries to enact a replacement corporate tax giveaway.

FINDINGS: TRANSPARENCY 2022

Overview

250 programs
(154 programs with varying transparency + 96 with none)

Average score = 22/100
Known cost = $17.5 billion

Exemplary states:
Nevada, Connecticut

Laggard states:
Alabama, Georgia

An evaluation of 250 major state-level subsidy programs across all 50 states and the District of Columbia reveals that more than 62% of them have company-specific, deal-specific online disclosures. Throughout this study we refer to these as "transparent programs" but with a range of scores from 0 to 85 and an average score of 36 out of 100 possible, it's clear that the quality of disclosure is very uneven and often poor. (The average score for all 250 programs is only 22.)

Among those 48 states plus the District of Columbia that provide some degree of recipient disclosure for at least one of the programs that we examined, Nevada and Connecticut scored the highest while Alabama and Georgia scored 0.

These 250 programs collectively reduced state revenues by $17.5 billion that we know of from the latest available data, plus many more billions that are hidden behind taxpayer confidentiality laws or not disclosed for other reasons.

This is the sixth state-level study of subsidy transparency by Good Jobs First and our fourth specific to state spending (rather than federal stimulus spending). A comparison of the results of the current study with those from previous iterations reveals that transparency has improved overall, even after accounting for the fact that we "raise the bar" with each new study. In our 2014 study, 135 of the 246 (or 55%) programs we examined had recipient-level disclosures, and four states had no disclosures for any of the selected programs. (The next section goes into more detail on these comparisons.)

In our previous studies, we weighed outcomes more than promises: we paid special attention to the value of disbursed grant or claimed tax benefit, the actual number of jobs created or retained, and the actual wage levels or payroll of those created or retained jobs—not just the approved or awarded subsidies, projected jobs, and promised wages and benefits.

In this current iteration, we continue to place heavy weights on the transparency of these important outcomes for subsidized projects. We also added a category for projected and actual capital investment, eligible in-state spending, or project cost. But more significantly, we added a category for advance notice and disclosure for the purpose of public participation and community deliberation (see Box 2), because of the mounting evidence that an inclusive process is critical for program success.

Box 2: Advance Notice, Public Participation, and Use of Non-Disclosure Agreements

No one should be left out of the economic development policy and planning process, least of all people who would be most affected by it. For a community to weigh in on proposals, information needs to be made publicly available before anything is signed.

Thus, in this study we look at what information is available online to the public before a deal is done. We found that 69 programs provide at least some information on when a public meeting will take place and what will be voted on. However, only a handful of programs in states like Nevada, District of Columbia, or Louisiana provide a good disclosure of which deals are up for approval.

We are unable, however, to assess in this study the effect of Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) on pre-approval subsidy transparency, or if programs with pre-approval disclosure might hide upcoming deals behind those contracts.

NDAs prevent public officials from disclosing any information on companies negotiating subsidies until after a deal is done. This gives the public no chance to voice opposition, or support, for the deals. An op-ed in a national newspaper pointed out that "[t]he nationwide number of NDAs signed by public officials is unknown, but it's clear they're widespread."[6] In Illinois, the op-ed says, NDAs are signed all the time when large corporations are involved. In Michigan, 13 state lawmakers and the governor signed NDAs while working on a deal later announced to be for GM.

A solution to this undemocratic process is a full ban on such agreements.

For the present study, we made these changes to our scoring metrics in response to the latest insights and standards in subsidy practices. We also swapped out 91 programs that are no longer active, significant, or relevant, and put in their place programs that are costly, controversial, and/or contentious and retained the other 155 from 2014 that continue to dominate their states' subsidy landscape.

By all metrics, transparency has improved, if unevenly and modestly, thanks to the concerted efforts of policy organizations, watchdog groups, labor unions, advocates, community coalitions, citizens and enlightened public servants on both sides of the political divide—many armed with the insights supplied by disclosure!

The Highs and the Lows

Figure 1 shows the average program scores for 51 states, ranked from the highest to the lowest. The top ten are Nevada, Connecticut, Illinois, Virginia, Indiana, North Carolina, Michigan, New York, Wisconsin, and Texas.

Figure 1: State transparency scores and rankings from best to worst, 2022 (scores out of 100)



State scores (average across the chosen programs) from the best to the worst.

The clear winner by a wide margin is Nevada. Its programs scored particularly well in anticipated and actual jobs, wages, and expenditures/investments, as well as advance notice and public participation (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Documents attached to one of Nevada's board meetings



Nevada is one of the few states with a sufficiently detailed economic development board meetings page. This is a screenshot of company applications and other key documents for just one meeting, accessed from: https://goed.nv.gov/about/notices-agendas/.

EXEMPLARY DISCLOSURE SITES:
Nevada

The Nevada Governor's Office of Economic Development website posts annual and bi-annual reports for all the programs we reviewed. These reports contain most of the data we scored, such as jobs both promised and created; wage outcomes; and capital investment amounts. All documents are downloadable in PDF form.

Nevada is also one of the few states with a detailed economic development board meetings page (see also Figure 2). The page contains agendas and meeting packets for the Governor's Office of Economic Development board and the Nevada Film Office. Meeting packets include company applications that list the address of the applicants, which is why the state received partial credit in the project information category (the applicant address may differ from the more critical project site address).

Figure 3a: Nevada's GOED pages

Approved Tax Abatements - Fiscal Year 2016
Nevada Governor's Office of Economic Development

Key: TG=Tourism/Gaming; CE=Clean Energy; HM=Health/Medical; AD=Aerospace/Defense; MM-Mining/Materials; MAN=Manufacturing; IT =Bus IT; LO=Logistics/Operations; HQ = Corporate Headquarters; N = New; E = Expansion

No.	Date	Company	Sector	New / Exp	County	Total Capital Investment	Contract Jobs (first 2 years of operation)	Average Wage	Approved Partial Sales & Use Tax Abatement	Approved Partial 4 Year Modified Bus.Tax Abatement	Approved 10 Year Partial Personal Property Abatement	Approved Partial 10 Year Real Property Abatement
1	07/09/15	BI Nutraceuticals, Inc.	MAN	N	Storey	$ 1,868,750	54	$ 18.62	$ 104,700	$ 34,700	$ 67,900	
2	07/09/15	Fulcrum Sierra BioFuels, LLC	MAN	E	Storey	$ 194,669,821	32	$ 30.87	$ 10,901,500	$ 30,600	$ 7,071,400	$ 4,333,100
3	07/09/15	Chewy.com, LLC	LO	E	Storey	$ 4,505,000	52	$ 16.26	$ 252,300	$ 29,400	$ 71,100	
4	07/09/15	Switch, LTD	IT	N	Storey	$ 136,089,982	50	$ 28.98	$ 7,621,000		$ 4,943,500	
5	07/09/15	Xtreme Manufacturing, LLC	MAN	E	Clark	$ 11,500,000	87	$ 17.24	$ 701,500	$ 56,000	$ 368,800	
6	07/09/15	Machine Zone, Inc.	IT	N	Clark	$ 50,000,000	78	$ 25.00	$ 3,050,000	$ 76,000	$ 696,700	
7	07/09/15	Neo Biotech USA Corp.	MAN	N	Washoe	$ 2,438,000	50	$ 28.06	$ 139,600	$ 53,300	$ 40,700	
8	07/09/15	Barclays Services LLC	LO	E	Clark	$ 2,260,604	150	$ 33.71	$ 137,900		$ 31,500	
9	09/17/15	New Millenium Building Systems	MAN	E	Churchill	$ 3,891,509	17	$ 29.28	$ 217,900	$ 19,900	$ 148,700	
10	09/17/15	Turano Baking Company	MAN	N	Clark	$ 38,075,000	67	$ 23.11	$ 2,322,600	$ 67,500	$ 1,221,100	
11	09/17/15	VadaTech Inc	MAN	E	Clark	$ 4,306,000	6	$ 30.13	$ 262,700	$ 4,306,006	$ 138,100	
12	11/19/15	Vip Rubber Co., Inc.	MAN	N	Douglas	$ 550,000	35	$ 19.89	$ 28,100	$ 35,015	$ 17,677	
13	11/19/15	CJ Pony Parts, Inc.	AD	N	Clark	$ 1,596,250	25	$ 21.42	$ 97,371	$ 39,232	$ 22,238	
14	11/19/15	Triggs Laboratories, Inc.	MAN	N	Clark	$ 1,480,920	63	$ 24.20	$ 90,300	$ 76,700	$ 47,500	
15	11/19/15	eBay, Inc.	IT	N	Storey	$ 230,000,000	50	$ 20.34	$ 12,880,000	$ 50,771	$ 3,591,396	
16	11/19/15	eBay, Inc.	IT	E	Clark	$ 182,000,000	2	$ 36.06	$ 11,102,000		$ 2,509,716	
17	11/19/15	Franzen-Hill, Inc.	LO	N	Storey	$ 3,253,500	15	$ 26.27	$ 182,196	$ 23,376	$ 115,113	
18	11/19/15	Premium Waters, Inc.	MAN	N	Clark	$ 10,680,350	29	$ 21.58	$ 651,500	$ 31,866	$ 342,500	

Screenshot of Nevada's approved tax abatements, accessed from: https://goed.nv.gov/additional-resources/reports/.

Figure 3b: Nevada's outcome disclosure pages

Approved Tax Abatements - Fiscal Year 2019
2-Year and 5-Year Audit Results

						2 Year Audit				5 Year Audit				Company Projections			Audit Findings		
No.	Date	Company	Contract	Effective Date	Withdrew	Audit Date	Pending	Compliant	Non-Comp.	Audit Date	Pending	Compliant	Non-Comp.	Jobs	Avg Wage	CapEx	Jobs	Avg Wage	CapEx
1	07/11/18	Bently Heritage	1	06/01/18		05/31/20	1			06/01/23				6	$ 21.95	$ 4,270,434	2 AND 5-YEAR AUDIT PENDIN		
2	07/11/18	Cyanco Company, LLC	1	07/11/18		07/10/20	1			07/11/23				20	$ 44.53	$ 11,048,600			
3	07/11/18	Figure Technologies, Inc.	1	06/04/18		06/03/20	1			06/04/23				65	$ 30.01	$ 264,615			
4	09/20/18	Air Liquide Hydrogen Energy US, LLC	1	08/31/20		08/31/22	1			08/31/25				16	$ 27.53	$ 83,093,000			
5	09/20/18	Amami Systems			1														
6	09/20/18	ARES Nevada, LLC					1			12/30/04				15	$ 37.84	$ 25,501,053			
7	09/20/18	Fresenius Kabi, LLC	1	01/01/19		12/31/20	1			01/01/24				20	$ 28.44	$ 1,866,151			
8	09/20/18	Schlosser Forge Company dba Arconic			1														
9	09/20/18	SendCutSend, LLC	1	09/07/18		09/06/20	1			09/07/23				6	$ 29.05	$ 12,238,900			
10	09/20/18	The Power-Sonic Corporation	1	12/03/18		12/02/20	1			12/03/23				50	$ 40.52	$ 448,700			
11	09/20/18	Zuffa, LLC dba Ultimate Fighting Challenge	1	10/19/18		10/18/20	1			08/09/39				30	$ 37.12	$ 7,956,000			
12	11/15/18	Aqua Metals, Inc.	1	01/01/19		12/31/20	1			01/01/24				28	$ 67.73	$ 33,000			
13	11/15/18	Berkley MF, LLC (formerly Berkley International)	1	09/20/19		09/19/21	1			09/19/24				28	$ 22.96	$ 1,614,500			
14	11/15/18	Design, LLC	1	10/15/18		10/14/20	1			10/15/23				50	$ 31.25	$ 300,000,000			
15	11/15/18	Fox Factory, Inc.	1	01/01/19		12/31/20	1			01/01/24				50	$ 22.73	$ 482,500			
16	11/15/18	HAPPIE Home, Inc.			1														
17	11/15/18	James Loudspeaker, LLC	1	10/03/18		10/02/20	1			10/03/23				16	$ 25.92	$ 650,000			
18	11/15/18	Owned Outcomes			1														
19	11/15/18	Premium Waters, Inc.	1	10/14/18		10/13/20	1			10/14/23				12	$ 22.89	$ 12,059,600			
20	11/15/18	Redwood Materials, Inc.	1	12/07/18		12/06/20	1			12/07/23				31	$ 27.42	$ 3,841,720			
21	11/15/18	RfXcel Corporation	1	01/01/19		12/31/20	1			01/01/24				82	$ 47.43	$ 625,000			
22	03/21/19	Autobox, LLC dba Deliver EZ			1														
23	03/21/19	MOBE LLC			1														
24	03/21/19	Nikkiso Cryo, Inc.			1														

Screenshot of Nevada's outcome disclosure, accessed from https://goed.nv.gov/additional-resources/reports/..

Connecticut's case is particularly interesting: because one of its subsidy programs was created via a public legislative session for just Lockheed Martin, a federal defense contractor, information about the deal had to be made public before approval, boosting the program's score in the advance public notice category.

Eight states received scores above 0 for all the programs we selected (mainly because their programs are disclosed by one agency in one place on the web). A few, like Arizona, Maryland, and Vermont scored just above average because their disclosures, though comprehensive, are missing some of the critical pieces that we were after.

However, even the most transparent states still have a few dark corners, especially when it comes to some of the more controversial

EXEMPLARY DISCLOSURE SITES:
Connecticut

Connecticut posts a good amount of recipient-level data on its Open Data Portal, under the Department of Economic and Community Development's Business Assistance and Tax Credit portfolios. For example, the Manufacturing Assistance Act's presents recipient data on job creation promises and outcomes, as well as project status and penalties in an online database that can easily be downloaded to Excel.

Figure 4: Connecticut Open Data Portal

Screenshot of Connecticut's Open Data Portal, accessed from: https://data.ct.gov/browse?q=Department%20of%20Economic%20and%20Community%20Development&sortBy=relevance.

programs. Seventeen (17) states provide information at the recipient level for all but one of the programs we evaluated. That is, these opaque programs are but exceptions to the norm in otherwise-transparent states. These undisclosed programs typically consist of:

1) "as-of-right" tax breaks (e.g., most R&D tax credits) where eligible companies can claim credits on their tax returns without going through any approval process
2) film subsidies, which are typically administered by entities separate from the main economic development or commerce agency
3) data center subsidies, which often have non-disclosure baked into their statutes
4) joint state-local programs, where recipient data is typically provided by the localities involved if they are provided at all

The lowest-scoring states besides Alabama and Georgia, which have no recipient disclosure for any of the programs we evaluated, are North Dakota, New Hampshire, Maine, and Delaware. Like Delaware, six states—Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia—provided disclosures for just one of their programs in our sample.

Georgia is an oddity. It publishes online some information on companies approved for state grants but leaves that information online for only 30 days. We do not consider such ephemeral public data access as transparency. What's worse, the state provides no information for any length of time for its $900-million-a-year film tax credit—the fifth most expensive program in our list, and the nation's costliest media subsidy.

Improvers and Backsliders

Not only does Nevada have the highest score, but it is also the most improved state over the past eight years by absolute change in both scores and ranks. This impressive advance traces to 2015, when a law was passed to require that the Governor's Office of Economic Development disclose recipient level data for various tax abatements. Besides disclosing the subsidy amounts for each company as well as job, wage, and investment promises and outcomes, it now provides a decent amount of information to the public on subsidy applicants *before* those awards are approved.

Other states that made significant headway in transparency include Kansas and South Carolina, though they still have a ways to go. Kansas' 2019 transparency law resulted in the creation of an online database of subsidy recipients and pushed the state from no disclosure to 15th place. After a negative subsidy audit and court case, South Carolina started disclosing company names, award values, and new jobs count for its major programs. As a result, the state moved from a marginal rank in 2014 to 22nd in 2022.

Illinois and North Carolina continue to do well (both provide data on subsidy payments as well as job and wage outcomes) but they still lag in terms of advance public notification.

Box 3: Selected Developments in Transparency

Nevada

In 2014 Nevada awarded Tesla with $1.3 billion in state and local subsidies, some of it in the form of transferable tax credits. The enabling legislation required full transparency from the Governor's Office of Economic Development, including posting online job and investment outcomes and subsidy payments. In addition, a 2015 change to a state law requires the office to disclose recipient-level data for various tax abatements. In 2019, the new disclosures allowed the *Reno Gazette-Journal* to show that many subsidized companies fell short on job creation or wage promises.[7]

Kansas

In 2019, state legislators, with bipartisan support, passed legislation that requires the Kansas Department of Commerce to create an online public-access portal with recipient-level data for major subsidies. The portal now includes company-specific data for 11 programs, including controversial and problematic STAR Bonds and Promoting Employment Across Kansas (PEAK). Unfortunately, only the deals awarded after the legislation was enacted are included in the portal. The legislature also required the Kansas Legislative Division of Post Audit to evaluate subsidy programs every three years.

South Carolina

In 2020, in a lawsuit brought by a state senator against the South Carolina Commerce Department, a judge ruled that subsidy recipient data is public information that the Commerce Department cannot withhold. An audit done the same year by the Legislative Audit Council found a lack of transparency and poor subsidy oversight by the Department. As a result of those events, the Commerce Department and the Coordinating Council for Economic Development, a board that approves subsidy awards, started disclosing recipient data for grant programs such as the Job Development Credit and the Closing Fund. Tax-based subsidies, however, are still missing recipient-level disclosure.

Many states that scored low in 2022 also scored low in 2014, although Delaware did go from having no information to *some* minimal information on companies receiving support from its Strategic Fund program.

A few states have regressed on certain programs: going from bad to worse, Alabama stopped reporting on its training grant program; Georgia stopped hosting its online database of grant recipients and now instead only keeps the information online for 30 days; and Louisiana replaced its 10-year or full-duration estimate of project-specific tax costs for its Industrial Tax Exemption Program with just the first-year exemption costs.

Table 1 shows the difference between states' 2022 rank and 2014 rank, how each state moved up or down the ratings relative to other states.

Table 1: Changes in state rankings from 2014 to 2022

State	Rank Change
Nevada	44
Kansas	30
South Carolina	23
Virginia	14
Connecticut	12
Arizona, California	10
Indiana	8
Colorado	7
Arkansas, South Dakota	5
Florida, Nebraska	4
Idaho, Montana, New Jersey	3
Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, New Mexico	2
Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island	1
Illinois, West Virginia	-2
Alaska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington	-3
Alabama, Ohio, Oregon, Utah	-4
D.C., Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Wisconsin	-5
Maine, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Tennessee	-6
Missouri	-8
Maryland	-13
Vermont	-15
Wyoming	-20

Keep in mind that ranks are relative. They go from 1 to 47 in 2022 and 1-46 in 2014. Just because a state dropped in rank does not mean that its transparency got worse; it might simply mean that other states have overtaken it, or that it rated less well on our "steeper grading curve," or both.

Transparency vs. Accountability

As previously mentioned, program transparency does not by itself equal program accountability. Texas's Chapter 313 comes with a billion-dollar price tag and a cloud of controversy, but it has the best recipient disclosures of all 250 programs we rated (scoring 85 out of 100, compared to the nationwide average score of 22)—complete with advance-disclosure packets consisting of application forms, legal documents, and fiscal impact analyses for each recipient housed on a central state website before the proposal makes its way to the voting table.

Similarly, Virginia's Commonwealth's Development Opportunity Fund received the second highest score (79), but it is a deal-closing grant awarded by the Governor at his or her discretion and thus prone to abuse and misuse.

Even though Nevada is the overall most transparent state by our metrics, a 2019 journalistic investigation revealed that many subsidized companies fell short on their promised new jobs and investments, and some of them were not even penalized with clawbacks as required by law.

In our universe of examined programs, 24 offer refundable tax credits costing $2.1 billion collectively. "Refundable" means that if the company's income tax bill is not large enough to absorb the dollar-for-dollar tax credit, the excess is refunded to the taxpayer. As such, these are essentially cash grants except they do not go through the scrutiny that grant appropriations do. As problematic as they are, we found them no more or less well disclosed than non-refundable tax credits.

On the other hand, problematic programs being transparent could be the exception rather than the rule: film and data center subsidies, which tend to have lackluster job outcomes, are also less well disclosed (see "Box 4: Data Center Subsidies" and "Box 5: Film Production Subsidies"), and the opacity of many as-of-right R&D programs is matched only by their enormous costs.

Box 4: Data Center Subsidies

In simple terms, data centers (or "server farms") are large, highly secured warehouses full of computers that store and process all back-end information for the web. Their importance exploded with the rise of cloud computing and more recently the pandemic has led to further expansion of people's online existence. With this development, data center subsidy programs also proliferated across the country such that almost 30 states now have them. We included 16 data center programs in this study (two from Wyoming).

Typical data center subsidies exempt companies from paying sales and use taxes on electricity, computers, building materials, and/or software. Some programs also abate company property taxes. Because data centers are very capital-intensive (and the servers must have to be replaced periodically), and because they consume a great deal of electricity (estimated to be more than 2 percent of all U.S. Kw-H), those tax exemptions can be extremely expensive in lost revenue. For example, in 2020, Iowa lost $128 million in revenue this way, and Virginia lost $110 million. And the cost is hardly worth it, as data centers create very few permanent jobs, and benefit narrowly tech giants such as Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Facebook, and Apple.

Nationally, we cannot estimate even the *aggregate* cost of the 16 data center tax break programs we examined (much less any company-specific sums), because only seven of the 15 states disclose program costs.

Of those seven reporting programs, disclosure quality is poor: their average score is 14 out of 100. Best-scoring programs in Nevada and Illinois disclose recipient subsidy information as well as job promises and outcomes. Only Nevada allows the public to see applicant information before deals are done.

States *with* transparent programs include: Arizona, Illinois, Nevada, Texas, Virginia, Washington state, and Wyoming (Business Ready grants).

States that do not post recipient data online: Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming (sales tax exemptions).

Box 5: Film Production Subsidies

About 33 states have a program (or two) that subsidizes film and/or TV productions. Most are either refundable or transferable tax credits, which are effectively cash payments since those credits can be rebated as or sold to a third party.

We included 29 film or TV production subsidy programs in this study. The combined annual cost of those programs is $2.5 billion. Georgia alone spent $894 million in FY 2022 and is the fifth most expensive program in this study (a state analysis estimates the program will cost the state over $1 billion in FY 2023[8]).

Despite these high costs, 14 of the 29 film subsidy programs provide no online recipient disclosure whatsoever. Georgia's program is among them. Its score of zero has not changed since 2014, even though the program's cost has risen by $808 million in that period.

That said, those 15 states that do post some sort of recipient data online score above average: 34 points. Virginia's Motion Picture Opportunity Fund is tied for third best transparency in this study. It is one of only two programs to disclose project industry codes and the only program to disclose both jobs promised and created.

States with transparent programs: California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia.

States with no recipient data online: Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Washington state.

Disclosures under the Microscope

We constructed our metrics based on what we at Good Jobs First believe to be *the least* that states should do for transparency that entails only the most basic and essential information that the public is entitled to.

Breaking the total scores down by category provides more nuanced insight into how transparency practices differ (Table 2). Again, we see a wide variation among states: Alabama and Georgia have 0 in all these categories as none of the programs we examined for them are transparent; some states have high scores in one category and low scores in others, i.e., they are uneven across programs; and others repeatedly come out on top for multiple categories for multiple programs. Below we discuss the results for each category at both the program level and the state level.

Project Information:

location (8) + date/duration (1) + nature of Project (1) = 10 points out of 100

Main takeaway:

17 programs aced it, including some big ones.

Seventeen programs received a perfect 10 in this category, including New York's Industrial Development Agencies (IDAs) and Louisiana's Industrial Tax Exemption Program (ITEP). Four are Indiana's, while Louisiana and Montana each had three.

The average score for this category is 4.6/10 among the 154 transparent programs (i.e., those with recipient disclosures), which is not the worst. In fact, only 19 received 0 (four of

Arizona's programs find themselves in this list). However, 34 of the transparent programs are missing the project location (not even the city or county it is in), arguably one of the most important pieces of information.

The best performing states in the project information category (averaged across each state's programs) are Indiana (8), Illinois (7.4), Kansas (7.2). Besides Alabama and Georgia,

Arkansas and Maine also scored 0, meaning that they do not disclose the location, timing/duration, or type of project for any of the programs.

Knowing the full address of subsidized projects allows for deal analysis from equity and efficiency perspectives: Are the projects located in disinvested areas that need new employment or in areas already doing well? Are the jobs accessible via public transit? Location of projects helps to answer these and many other questions (such as the impact on race, poverty, and fiscal stress and whether a project is offsetting the effects of past plant closings.

Project dates and durations are also important because the public should know *when* a deal is in effect (as many last decades). Michigan's Economic Growth Authority or "MEGA" program, for example, offer subsidies up to 20 years: deals done in 2012 will still cost the state's budget well into the 2030's.

Finally for this category, the nature of the project is necessary because public reactions to the prospect of a chemical factory are likely to differ from those to an office park, and from new construction to office relocation.

Advance notice and public participation:

full application (5) + impact analysis (3) + public meetings (4) + full agreements (3) = 15 out of 100.

Main takeaway:

Agendas are common, details are rare.

This is a new scoring category that we added for 2022 to emphasize the importance of pre-approval transparency (see Box 2). We consider public participation to be an integral part of the subsidy award process, as it is crucial for public trust and for governmental accountability. Knowing in advance which companies are applying, and for how much, enables communities to have a say in the process.

On our first foray into this metric, we had few to no expectations. To our delight, we uncovered an impressive amount of information for a few programs: the District of Columbia's Property Tax

Abatements and Exemptions program received a perfect 15, meaning it provides full applications, impact analyses, public meetings with full details on what is to be discussed, and full agreements ahead of approval (though D.C. is unique as a city-state hybrid which requires many deals to be approved by the Council in open public meetings). Texas's Chapter 313 and Tennessee's FastTrack are two other exemplary programs in this area, sharing second place with 9 points.

The best overall-performing states in this category by program average are Nevada (6), California (3.2), D.C. (3.0), and Louisiana (3.0). Louisiana made it to the honor list by providing a list of applicants prior to approval for three of its five programs we examined. D.C. relied entirely on the one exemplary program to bring up its average for the category. Seventeen states and about half of the transparent programs scored 0, which is disappointing but not surprising. The average score for this category among transparent programs is just 1.5 out of 15.

The best-disclosed sub-category is public meetings held by boards charged with reviewing the applications. Ten programs scored a perfect 4 in this and 59 received partial scores from one point for providing just the meeting dates to 3 points for program names and company names.

Full applications, full tentative agreements, and cost-benefit analyses are, by contrast, very rare. Just 13 programs received any points at all in the "full applications" sub-category, and only seven received full points. Impact analyses are available for only four of our 250 programs. And only Washington D.C. posts full agreements ahead of time for its Property Tax Abatements and Exemptions.

EXEMPLARY DISCLOSURE SITES:

Indiana

The privatized Indiana Economic Development Corporation hosts on its website an easy-to-find database of subsidy awards granted to companies via more than two dozen programs. The database is also easy to navigate by means of the eight dropdowns. After clicking on a recipient, a user can see multiple data points on a deal. Not only is the information presented in a clear and usable fashion, but the database is also linked to other related subsidy awards that a recipient has received.

All that said, we note with caution that the Indiana website has been twice exposed by WTHR-TV Indianapolis in a series called "Reality Check: Where Are the Jobs?" to selectively include or exclude deals in ways that make the Corporation's performance look better than it apparently was.[10]

Figure 5: An Agreement from Indiana's Contracts Database



Screenshot of a subsidy agreement from Indiana's contracts database, accessed from: https://secure.in.gov/apps/iedc/transparencyportal/viewtaxgrantloancontract/8ab4c5290fd8eb11bacc001dd804a83b.

Company/recipient information:

FEIN (1) + NAICS (1) + parent company name (3) = 5 out of 100

Main takeaway:

Massive fails were observed in recipient identification.

This category deals with the "who." All it takes to receive 5 out of 5 is providing unique, unambiguous identification for the ultimate recipient of an award and its industry. Yet that somehow stumped more than half of the transparent programs and 33 states; they went scoreless. The average score among transparent programs is a dismal 0.4 out of 5 and next to nil among all programs.

Most programs provide only LLC names (a couple even use project code names for a subset of their recipients, masking the identity of even the facial beneficiaries) and broad industry classes like "manufacturing." Nevada, for example, disclosed that Design, LLC was approved in 2018 for $18.7 million in sales and use tax exemption. Few would know that Google created and owns this LLC.

As for states, Indiana tops the chart with a 2.4 out of 5, mainly because it provided the parent company names as part of the full contracts or agreements for four of its five programs. Other top-performing states (relatively speaking) are Wisconsin (1.6), Connecticut (1), and Maryland (1).

Subsidy information:

approved/awarded amount (4) + disbursed/claimed amount (6) + status (10) = 20 out of 100

Main takeaway:

Not one state received perfect scores.

This is a fundamental category that we have always weighed heavily. Large subsidy awards can amount to hundreds of millions of dollars over multiple years, especially from programs such as investment tax credits or property tax abatements. Full disclosure needs to include both the amount of subsidy approved and, over time, the amount of subsidy paid out. The company's performance (actual capital invested, jobs created, and wages paid) should be updated at least annually, and any clawback or other penalty incurred for under-performing also needs to be stated.

(Note that we only evaluate whether such data is posted online; we do not have the means to determine whether the posted data is accurate.)

The good news is that almost all 154 transparent programs received some points in this category; the ones that didn't are Arizona's (see Figure 6) and Texas's data center programs, Hawaii's Enterprise Zones, Kansas's High Performance, Mississippi's Advantage Jobs, two expired but still paying programs of Nebraska, and Oregon's investment incentives.

What's not so good are the scores: The average for the 154 transparent programs is 8.7 out of 20. Moreover, while 107 programs scored a perfect 4 in the sub-category of approved or awarded amount, only 68 did for the actual amount of grant paid out or tax benefit claimed

Figure 6: Arizona's data center subsidy disclosures

TABLE 5 – FISCAL YEAR 2021
PRE-APPROVED COMPUTER DATA CENTER INCENTIVE PROGRAM

FY 2021 APPLICANT (PRE-APPROVED)	MINIMUM STATUTORY CAPITAL INVESTMENT [1]
NTT Global Data Centers PH, LLC	$200,000,000+
Compass Datacenters Phx I, LLC	$200,000,000+
Microsoft Corporation	$200,000,000+
Iron Mountain Datacenters, LLC	$200,000,000+
TOTAL	$800,000,000+

Arizona's disclosure of data center subsidy recipients, arguably one of the least informative disclosures ever, accessed from: https://www.azcommerce.com/media/vtwnihhl/fy-21-aca-annual-report.pdf.

(i.e., financial/fiscal outcomes for the state), and even fewer (46) had both amounts. And while 80 programs provided some kind of status indication, only 16 of these provided project status and enforcement actions for all projects. (Virginia and Wisconsin each had three programs on this honor roll.)

Furthermore, not a single state provided the disbursed value for all its programs. Indiana came close with this information for four of its five programs. Connecticut, Kansas, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin each had three programs for which both the approved and the disbursed amounts are provided.

Maryland, Nevada, and New York received a perfect 4 out of 4 for providing awarded subsidy value for all their programs, while Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, and North Carolina received the highest scores in actual disbursed amounts. Virginia, Wisconsin, Michigan, and North Carolina are exemplary in consistently reporting the status of their projects.

Besides Alabama and Georgia, the lowest-scoring states in this category are Hawaii, Idaho, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and Delaware. Overall, eight states scored 0 in the approved/awarded sub-category and double that scored 0 in the disbursed/claimed category, indicating a clear discrepancy in the transparency level for anticipated or allocated sums versus actual payouts.

Figure 7: Florida's Incentive Portal



The Florida Incentive Portal is a good example of an online disclosure database that is easy to use and navigate; accessed from: https://fldeoportal.secure.force.com/IncentivePortalSearch_Lightning.

> ### Jobs reporting:
> promised job creation (6) + actual job creation (14) = 20 out of 100
>
> #### Main takeaway:
> Projections are only slightly more common than outcomes.

As we do with actual versus anticipated subsidies, we put a lot of weight on the disclosure of actual jobs created/retained relative to anticipated, the latter important mainly as goal posts for assessing a deal's performance such that penalties may be doled out if necessary.

There turns out to be only a modest discrepancy between the two subcategories: 68 programs have data on projected jobs while 61 have data on actual jobs (another 14 and 16 programs received partial points in these sub-categories, respectively). The average program score is 8.9 out of 20.

Thirty-seven programs scored a perfect 20 for having both anticipated and actual figures for job creation (Connecticut, Illinois, and Nevada each had three).

States that scored the highest overall are Nevada (18.8), Connecticut (16), and Illinois (16). Nevada is the only state that received a full 14 for job creation outcomes for all five of its programs. Connecticut, Illinois, and North Carolina each had four perfect-14 programs. Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, and Nevada received the highest score (4.8/6) for promised jobs, as they have this information for only four out of five programs.

Thirteen states do not disclose job projections, while 17 states provided do not disclose job outcomes. Seven states besides Alabama and Georgia scored 0 for the whole category (Arkansas, D.C., Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Oklahoma), meaning that they disclose neither projections nor outcomes for new or retained jobs. The average state score is 5.5 out of 20 for the category.

Wages/payroll reporting:

promised new payroll (5) + actual new payroll (10) = 15 out of 100

Main takeaway:

wage disclosures are few and far between.

This category allows the public to see if subsidized jobs are decent jobs that pay wages that allow a person to live with dignity. In other words, it is not just about the quantity but also the quality.

Forty-four (44) programs received full or partial points for the expected wage/payroll and 33 received full or partial points for disclosing the actual wage/payroll. Only 12 programs got the full 15 points for the entire wage reporting category, most of them in Illinois or Nevada. The average score for transparent programs for the whole category is just 2.9 out of 15.

The best-performing states by far are Nevada and Illinois. Besides these two, Indiana and Kentucky did well on wage projections, while Washington and Virginia did well on wage outcomes. About half of the states scored 0, meaning they do not disclose either the projected or actual new salary or payroll for any major program.

Capital investment/ expenditure reporting:

promised investment (1) + actual investment (4) = 5 out of 100

Main takeaway:

Surprisingly, only 59 programs disclose projected cost.

Since some subsidies require a certain level of capital investment to qualify, and others are calibrated to corporate spending, disclosures should include the projected and actual amounts of investment. While usually this refers to buildings, machinery and equipment, some incentive programs, such as those for film productions, use in-state production spending as the measured investment, even if a shoot does not leave a physical structure behind.

Though it is common to see companies publicly touting their planned capital investment figures, only 59 programs (or 24% of all programs) had information on the projected investment and even fewer (45) on the actual investment. Only 24 programs scored perfectly for the whole category. The average score for the 154 transparent programs is 1.7 out of 5.

Nevada is the only state that provided the projected investment for all five programs. Indiana, Nevada, and New York received the highest score for actual investment. Fourteen states scored 0, meaning that they disclose neither the projected nor actual expenditures for any of their programs.

Data accessibility and ease of use:

accessible (3) + clear (2) + at least five years (2) + downloadable as excel (3) = 10

Main takeaway:

Many states have data portals; the rest need to catch up.

What good is the data if it is hidden, confusing, limited, and/or unusable? We have encountered many examples where disclosures are technically available online but nearly impossible to find. North Carolina's Customized Training reports were found in an obscure corner of the Joint Legislative Education Oversight Committee website. Virginia's data center disclosures are indexed by search engines but inaccessible from any of the agency's webpages.

All 154 programs that provided recipient data are awarded at least 1 point in this category. This is to acknowledge that any disclosure is better than no disclosure, but only eight programs received a perfect 10, meaning that these are easy to find and understand, with multiple years of data downloadable as spreadsheets (we gave a partial 1 out of 3 for pdf-only downloads). By contrast, some of the program sites in Colorado, New Jersey, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming are hardly usable. Overall, however, this is the best-performing category, with a seven-point average for transparent programs.

Figure 8: Maryland Finance Tracker



Screenshot of the Maryland Finance Tracker, accessed from: https://transparency.md.gov/public/single/?appid=2f3c6c3a-ce52-4211-b284-13060307027a&sheet=809d84d9-fa71-4af5-8727-62b9a62ff772&opt=ctxmenu. Even though it misses many important data points on subsidy recipients, Maryland's database is easy to use and navigate, updating rapidly in real time based on a user's selection criteria.

As for states, Connecticut, Maryland, New York, and Oregon are the most accessible, while North Dakota, New Hampshire, Wyoming, West Virginia, Utah, Tennessee, and Delaware are the least accessible, (having provided little to no data for all their programs or data for just one or two programs.)

Figure 9: Average state and program score category

STATE AVERAGE



PROGRAM AVERAGE



Average state and program scores (out of 100) for major categories and sub-categories

Box 6: Texas Chapter 313 – Best-Disclosed Program

The Texas Economic Development Act, known as Chapter 313 after its place in the Texas tax code, is the highest-scoring program in this study, with 85 points. It was also the best-scoring program in our 2014 transparency study.

The program abates property taxes that would otherwise go to schools and disproportionately benefits heavy industry, such as oil refineries and chemical plants. Deals are approved by local school districts and ratified by the state Comptroller's office. The state reimburses school districts for the lost tax revenue, and those payments cost the state treasury around $1 billion a year.

The Texas State Comptroller posts various documents related to Chapter 313 deals online. Among those are company applications for subsidies, amendments to those applications, and certification packets with a deal's analysis. All this material is posted before a deal is approved. There are also agreements and amendments to those contracts. Outcomes are disclosed in biannual progress reports (jobs) and school district costs data (subsidy amounts). There are also lists of companies with active and inactive Chapter 313 agreements.

Chapter 313 is a good example of the axiom that transparency does not equal accountability or effectiveness. Indeed, after years of criticism of the program by community groups, liberal and conservative think tanks, and investigative journalists, the Texas legislature in 2021 chose not to renew the program and it is now slated to sunset at the end of 2022. If the sunsetting of the program is the ultimate form of accountability, then Chapter 313 also illustrates how vital disclosure is: None of the investigations that revealed the program to be so wasteful would have been possible without disclosure data.

Figure 10: List of Chapter 313 projects with links to full portfolio

- Form 50-767 Report on Value Lost for **2014** - PDF
- Form 50-767 Report on Value Lost for **2015** - PDF

Note: You can sort the table below by clicking on any of the headers. Sort multiple columns simultaneously by holding down the Shift key and clicking a second, third or even fourth column header.

School District	App. No.	Applying Entity	Application Date	First Full Tax Year	Phase
Abbott ISD	1364	Sun Valley Solar, LLC	04/24/2019	2021	Agreement
Abernathy ISD	1655	Abernathy Solar, LLC	10/19/2021	2026	Application
Academy ISD	1539	250LB 8me LLC	11/03/2020	2023	Agreement
Academy ISD	1629	Five Wells Solar Center LLC	08/19/2021	2024	Application
Adrian ISD	313	Spinning Spur Wind Three, LLC	07/11/2013	2014	Agreement
Adrian ISD	255	Spinning Spur Wind Two, LLC	12/10/2012	2014	Agreement
Albany ISD	51	Hackberry Wind, LLC	08/30/2006	2007	Agreement
Alpine ISD	1025	SolaireHolman 1 LLC	06/25/2014	2016	Agreement
Alvin ISD	1619	Maxter Healthcare, Inc.	07/02/2021	2023	Agreement
Andrews ISD	1411	2W Permian Solar, LLC	08/16/2019	2022	Agreement
Andrews ISD	1301	Jumbo Hill Wind Project, LLC	10/16/2018	2020	Agreement
Andrews ISD	1293	Lapetus Energy Project, LLC	09/17/2018	2020	Agreement
Andrews ISD	1281	Prospero Energy Project, LLC	08/15/2018	2021	Agreement
Andrews ISD	1463	Prospero Solar II, LLC	01/17/2020	2022	Agreement
Angleton ISD	1595	Cottonwood Bayou Solar II, LLC	04/26/2021	2024	Agreement
Angleton ISD	1594	Cottonwood Bayou Solar, LLC	04/26/2021	2024	Agreement
Angleton ISD	1099	INEOS USA, LLC	08/26/2014	2019	Agreement
Angleton ISD	1192	INEOS USA, LLC	05/19/2017	2020	Agreement

Property Value Studies & Appraisal District Role

Statutes and Rules

Guidelines and Frequently Asked Questions

Resources

Tax Code Chapter 313 School Property Tax Limitation Agreement Documents
(as required by HB 3676, 81st Legislature)

Chapter 313 Fiscal Notes Article
– published April 2016

Local Property Tax Information

Chapter 313 Exclusion Zone Online Mapping Tool

Chapter 313 Gross Tax Benefit Estimation Tool

This video is to be used for informational purposes only. Continuing education (CE) credit for these topics will be available only for live events and participation.
Chapter 313 Value Limitation Agreements Webinar

Screenshot of the Texas Comptroller's repository of project documents, accessed from:
https://comptroller.texas.gov/economy/local/ch313/agreement-docs.php.

CHANGES SINCE 2014

The rank changes in Table 1 tell only one part of the story. This section goes into greater detail in comparing the two studies' findings. We confirm that transparency has improved by all measures and show which programs improved or regressed by which measures in the eight-year interim.

State-Level Changes

Table 2 shows, for the 51 states, the absolute changes or differences in:

1. **raw scores**—this is simply the difference between 2022 and 2014 scores, which does not account for the changes between the two studies in program selection or metrics.
2. **scores for overlapping programs**—state scores are computed using the average of only the 155 programs common to both studies; this accounts for changes between the two studies in program selection but not in metrics.
3. **normalized scores**—the raw scores from 2014 and 2022 are rescaled by the minimum and maximum for each so that the lowest becomes 0 and the highest becomes 1 for both (Illinois in 2014 and Nevada in 2022).
4. **standardized scores**—the raw scores from both 2014 and 2022 based on the full program selection for each year are rescaled such that the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1 for both. The 2014 "Z scores" (as they are called) run from –1.3 to +2.7, and the 2022 Z scores run from –1.5 to +2.8.

Table 2: Four ways to compare the 2014 and 2022 results

state	1) difference in raw scores	2) difference in raw scores (overlap only)	3) difference in normalized scores	4) difference in standardized scores
Alabama	-3.2	-4.0	-0.05	-0.38
Alaska	-0.9	-0.5	-0.01	-0.14
Arizona	8.4	10.7	0.14	0.47
Arkansas	6.0	7.5	0.09	0.22
California	10.5	2.3	0.17	0.65
Colorado	7.7	4.0	0.13	0.45
Connecticut	18.6	5.0	0.31	1.26
Delaware	5.0	8.3	0.08	0.16
District of Columbia	-5.0	-7.2	-0.07	-0.42
Florida	0.0	-10.0	0.01	0.01
Georgia	-3.8	-3.8	-0.06	-0.41

Hawaii	5.0	3.7	0.08	0.16
Idaho	5.6	0.0	0.09	0.20
Illinois	-19.0	-16.3	-0.27	-1.08
Indiana	10.4	8.7	0.18	0.72
Iowa	1.4	4.0	0.03	0.07
Kansas	28.8	23.0	0.45	1.76
Kentucky	-2.8	-13.7	-0.03	-0.16
Louisiana	-7.8	-9.8	-0.11	-0.49
Maine	-1.8	-2.3	-0.03	-0.28
Maryland	-17.0	-17.0	-0.25	-1.08
Massachusetts	0.4	0.4	0.01	-0.06
Michigan	-16.6	-27.0	-0.24	-0.96
Minnesota	-3.2	0.0	-0.04	-0.28
Mississippi	-3.8	4.5	-0.05	-0.37
Missouri	-10.4	-27.5	-0.15	-0.69
Montana	2.6	7.0	0.05	0.11
Nebraska	3.4	-1.0	0.06	0.10
Nevada	63.0	66.5	0.99	4.06
New Hampshire	-2.7	-2.0	-0.04	-0.33
New Jersey	4.8	15.0	0.08	0.24
New Mexico	3.0	-3.0	0.05	0.06
New York	3.2	-6.0	0.07	0.26
North Carolina	-6.6	3.5	-0.08	-0.34
North Dakota	-1.6	-2.7	-0.02	-0.27
Ohio	0.2	6.0	0.01	-0.04
Oklahoma	-4.6	-2.0	-0.07	-0.40
Oregon	-6.4	-18.0	-0.08	-0.39
Pennsylvania	-7.2	-4.5	-0.10	-0.52
Rhode Island	-0.8	-1.3	-0.01	-0.15
South Carolina	22.2	30.3	0.35	1.32
South Dakota	3.8	-2.3	0.06	0.14
Tennessee	-6.4	3.5	-0.09	-0.52
Texas	-4.2	4.0	-0.05	-0.23
Utah	-3.6	-5.0	-0.05	-0.35
Vermont	-18.6	-16.0	-0.27	-1.18
Virginia	16.8	31.3	0.28	1.11
Washington	-5.1	-13.0	-0.06	-0.31
West Virginia	2.4	4.0	0.04	0.01
Wisconsin	-6.6	13.0	-0.08	-0.36
Wyoming	-20.0	-19.2	-0.30	-1.36
	(avg.) 0.86	(avg.) 0.61	(avg.) 0.02	(range) [-1.36, +4.06]

Comparing our 2014 and 2022 results is tricky since we changed many programs and our scoring metrics. We present here four ways of comparing. #3 and #4 are two ways of “standardizing” the scores so that they are comparable despite methodological differences. These provide similar ranking for states in terms of raw score changes.

What do these numbers tell us? Columns #1 and #2 tell us simply that states on average scored better in 2022 than 2014. For #1, it could be that we happened to swap out less transparent programs for more transparent ones. However, #2 confirms that, the 155 programs common to both studies scored better in 2022 than they did in 2014. The fact that the average for #1 (0.86) is higher than the average for #2 (0.61) means that the new programs in 2022 also contributed to the overall higher average.

Columns #3 and #4 standardize the scores in 2014 and 2022 so that they are on the same scale. These would be as if scores for two school tests are scaled to account for differences in difficulty and other environmental factors affecting all students. The positive average (0.02) in #3 indicates that transparency has improved. By #4, a score of, say, 50 out of 100 in 2022 indicates better performance on our transparency "test" than the same score in 2014. These standardized measures are useful for seeing how the *individual states* improved or regressed relative to their peers.[9]

All these different measures of progress produced consistent state rankings. Nevada, for example, so out-performed and out-improved the other states that it is a runaway by all metrics. On the other hand, even though Massachusetts and Ohio received higher raw scores in 2022, by Z-scores they scored lower, meaning that they performed less well this time around compared to their peers.

Figure 11 shows how the 51 states changed on average in each category (using percentages, since the maximum possible points for some categories are different).

Figure 11: Comparison of 2014 and 2022 average state score by category



The full universe of programs for each study was used in making this chart, which should not be a problem since it is just as likely that we swapped in more transparent programs than we took out less transparent ones. Award and wage info could not be disaggregated by promised versus actual because they are tallied differently in the 2014 study.

States overall improved in supplying information about the projects, recipients, and job outcomes and making data more accessible and user-friendly. The drops in award information and wages reporting are likely due to the more stringent metrics used in 2022. The drop in the promised number of new jobs, on the other hand, is genuine since the metrics are similar, and it represents an exception to the other categories which are also graded similarly in both studies.

States that improved the most in each category include some of the exemplary states that have been mentioned multiple times, like Kansas and Virginia in project information, Indiana and Wisconsin in company information, Virginia, Kansas, and South Carolina in reporting actual jobs, and Nevada in almost everything.

Other standouts include Montana in project information, Colorado in actual new jobs, and Arizona in data accessibility. Despite receiving unremarkable scores overall (all three low to mid 20's), they showed significant improvement in these categories. At the other end, some states scored high in 2022 but dropped in certain categories—most notably Illinois, Louisiana, and Michigan.

Programs-Level Changes

We also looked at how our findings for the 155 overlapping programs changed, and here are the highlights:

1. Forty-eight programs saw increases in scores—16 of them from 0—and these span the gamut of tax credits, training funds, grants, and bonds and include quite a few from otherwise under-performing states.

2. Fifty-eight (58) programs saw drops in scores—11 of them to 0—and these consist of training programs, film incentives, and state-local bundled subsidies.

3. There are 47 programs that were not transparent in either year.

4. More programs regressed than improved in providing information on the project, subsidy award, status, and wages. Data usability saw the greatest number of rises, (though the sub-categories are slightly different for the two studies).

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Subsidy recipient transparency continues to rise among the states: more programs, more program years, and more actual outcomes. Some states have shown marked improvements. However, a minority of states still have no meaningful or only minimal recipient disclosure for their major programs. The lack of transparency surrounding the subsidy approval process in such states also undermines accountability.

Given this uneven progress, Good Jobs First recommends states take the following actions:

Create subsidy transparency portals that are easy to find (preferably linked from a program webpage), easy to understand (no jargon or ambiguous numbers), and easy to use. Minimally, users should see company names and subsidy amounts for all programs whether they are income tax credits, cash grants, sales tax exemptions or workforce development expenses. Job creation, wage and benefit, and investment promises and outcomes, as well as any penalties imposed for shortfalls, need to be included. And all the attendant project details we grade for here: street address of the project; corporate parent name; Employer Identification Number; North American Industry Classification System number, and project schedule/benchmarks.

Provide advance, pre-approval disclosure. Before a subsidy is approved: all applications (including cost-benefit studies) should be posted on an agency website at least 60 days before they will be subject to final approval. Interested parties should be able to sign up to receive an email or text notice of each such new posting.

Based on our past "report card" studies, we know that some state officials will see this study as a best practice guide to greater transparency and accountability. We welcome all inquiries from government agencies seeking to upgrade their disclosure portals and become future sunshine champions.

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

This is an update to studies we published in 2014 (*Show Us the Subsidized Jobs*), 2010 (*Show Us the Subsidies*), and 2007 (*State of State Disclosure*). It is also akin to our two studies rating the states on how well, or poorly, they disclosed the uses of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Obama stimulus) funds.

While in 2007 we gave states credit for reporting on subsidies of any kind, regardless of how important the program was, in the latter studies, we "raised the bar," grading more rigorously on the most important economic development subsidy programs in each state and the District of Columbia. In this study, we raise the bar again. For example, we give new weight to whether a state discloses a proposed subsidy deal in advance so that residents can opine and participate in the approval decision.

We determine a program's importance by factors such as cost and frequency of use. We also include programs that have been particularly controversial, even if their cost has recently declined. If a program has been controversial, that may indicate flaws that merit heightened public interest—hence the need for disclosure data. Such programs include data center and film production programs, deal-closing funds, or so-call "paying taxes to the boss" programs which use workers' withholding taxes to subsidize companies.

The decision to examine a limited number of programs from each state kept the scope of our research manageable. For most states we chose five programs, but for Colorado, Hawaii, and Washington we could find only four subsidy programs of significance. For Alaska, we were only able to find three. We thus looked at a total of 250 programs (updated from the 246 in the 2014 report).

Previous versions only rated programs controlled by state agencies except for New York's Industrial Development Agencies (IDAs), but this time we chose to incorporate a few state-enabled local government subsidies such as tax increment financing (TIF) districts, as they are some of the most expensive programs for both state and local governments.

In choosing our programs for this report, we began with those 246 we used in 2014. We retained 155; the rest were switched out for ones that are newer, costlier, or more relevant. Some programs were excluded because they had been phased out by state agencies or had become less important.

Once we had established our list of programs, we set out to determine whether each one has online recipient disclosure and the quality of its data. We contacted those state agencies that oversee the subsidy programs when we had questions about the data provided or could not find the data online after exhausting all searches.

For a program to be transparent at all, recipient names must be disclosed. If a program discloses, for example, only project code names and subsidy amounts, we deem that program not transparent, and it gets a 0. If we find a program that only provides recipient information for a limited time window, we also rate those as non-transparent.

As-of-right programs can be difficult to score. Also known as "entitlements," these are programs, in most cases tax-based, that allow any company that performs some eligible activity (investing or hiring, for example) to claim a subsidy on its income tax return. Often, they are structured as one-time awards (which companies can use up over multiple years). Research and development tax credits, for example, fit this category.

For the following reasons, we decided to treat those programs as any other subsidy category and not to give them preferences in outcome ratings: often as-of-right programs require some type of advanced notice, in some cases even applications and certifications; some programs remain invisible because some states claim the information is covered by taxpayer confidentiality (we have long disagreed, citing numerous counter-examples of robust state disclosures); and finally, as-of-right programs can be costly yet poorly understood—and therefore merit greater scrutiny.

We created these metrics based on what we at Good Jobs First believe to be the most important components of disclosure. Scores are based on what was online before February 10, 2022. Even though our 2014 study had a tough set of scoring criteria to reflect rising public expectations for government transparency, we held states to an even higher standard this time around, weighing pre-approval transparency and project performance more heavily.

We score the disclosures based on their inclusion of the following data elements with the point values in the parentheses that add up to 100: (see appendix A all sub-categories, point breakdowns, and detailed explanations on conditions for receiving partial points):

- Project information (10)
- Advance notice and public participation (15)
- Company/awardee information (5)
- Subsidy information (20)
- Job outcomes (20)
- Wage outcomes (15)
- Investment outcomes (5)
- Data accessibility (10)

Project information:

To get full points for this category, agencies must disclose: the street address or GPS coordinates so that anyone can pinpoint the project on a map and know which communities are affected (8 points); some temporal parameter—either the project duration or the month and year of the start or end of contract, agreement, or project (1); and the type or nature of the project, which can be as simple as "construction" or "relocation," or a more elaborate description.

Advance notice and public participation:

This is a new category that we added to this iteration of the study to emphasize the importance of pre-approval transparency. We consider public participation to be an integral part of the award process because subsidies are paid for by public dollars.

In this category, we consider whether the agency provides: full application documents (5 points), including cost-benefit analyses, at least 15 days ahead of public deliberations (3); public meeting schedules with detailed agendas on proposed deals (4); and draft agreements ahead of final approval so that communities are aware of the full deal they may be getting (3). Programs may receive partial points for any of these sub-categories if, for example, they provide a list of applicant names rather than full application packages, a meeting agenda without program names or applicant names, or full agreements only after approval.

To score programs in this category, we checked disclosure and program pages to see if any company applications are posted for programs we examined. If a program is governed by a board, we examined the board's webpage and looked for meeting dates, agendas, and other documents. To determine what information is disclosed ahead of a meeting, we examined previous meetings postings. In a few special cases like Connecticut's Special Act for Lockheed Martin in which a state passed new subsidy legislation to accommodate a company, we examined availability of various documents and information posted to the legislature website before the vote and double checked these with press clips to determine if a company name was disclosed at the time of the bill passage.

Company/awardee information:

This category is identical to its counterpart in the 2014 study, with 1 point for providing the federal employer identification numbers or FEIN, 1 point for providing the North American Industry Classification System, or NAICS, codes, and 3 points for providing the names of parent companies, so that the public knows who is ultimately receiving the subsidy.

Subsidy information:

This category consists of the amount of subsidy approved or awarded (4), the amount of subsidy disbursed or claimed (6), and project status (10). To get full points for this last sub-category, states need to post both the status (active, expired, renewed, canceled, etc.) as well as enforcement actions like clawbacks for projects that fail to meet their milestones.

Jobs reporting:

Given that job creation is commonly invoked to justify subsidies, there is no reason for leaving out either the projected number of new jobs (6) on which the amount of award is based or the actual number of new jobs (14) by which project performance is determined.

Wages/payroll reporting:

It is not enough to just create jobs, but projects must create good jobs to deserve public subsidies. Disclosures should state clearly both the projected/expected/promised pay (5) and the actual pay (10) of new jobs.

Investment reporting:

We added this category to credit programs that disclose the promised (1) and actual (4) in-state capital investment, expenditure, or cost.

Data accessibility:

Data is only as useful as it is accessible and usable. To get full points, disclosures must be: easy to find and not hidden in some obscure corner (3); easy to understand and not hidden behind jargon or nebulous phrases (2); downloadable and not locked behind a web interface (3); and at least five years of data must be provided (2). Because this category requires some judgment calls, we designed strict guidelines for partial points. Full points are given for data that are two clicks away from the main incentives landing page, minus 1 point for each additional click. One point (out of a possible 2) is given to programs with unclear data fields. One point (out of 2) is given if multiple years of data are not linked to one another. To get full points for downloads, data must be in a structured format without the need for additional scraping. They must come as delimited text where the data fields are in constant positions for all observations, comma-separated values (CSV), Excel, or other database formats (.dta, JSON, .gdb, .accdb, etc.). If a program's disclosures are only in PDFs, even if these contain tables that can be scraped, it gets only 1 point for accessibility.

Using all of these metrics, we scored each program on a scale of 0 to 100 (see Figure 12 for an example of a score sheet). Full points are awarded to programs that met all the criteria above, and partial points are given under certain conditions such as incomplete or partial data. In cases where programs are disclosed in more than one place (e.g., in annual reports and in open data portals), we evaluated all the available information as a whole.

We analyzed the total scores and category breakdowns at both the program level and at the state level (i.e., aggregated with state as the unit such that any state-level statistics are computed with 51 aggregate measures while program-level statistics are computed with 250 individual observations).

We compared our present findings with those in our earlier studies, focusing particularly on the most recent, in 2014. We examined how states and programs changed in this eight-year interim in terms of ranks, raw scores, and scores relative to each distribution or "standardized" scores.

We also examined changes by key categories like recipient identity and job creation. To make the results of the two studies equivalent, we distributed the penalty points in the 2014 study for each program to all categories by their share of the final program score before the penalty is applied, so that it matches our 2022 system which has "built-in" penalties for each sub-category (meaning that instead of applying a penalty at the very end, we deducted points as we were scoring each criterion.)

Figure 12. Sample Program Scoring Sheet

Financial Exposure **Scoring Details for State Programs** *Score criteria*	Maximum possible score
PROJECT INFO	
precise address/coordinates (8); zip code (5); city/county (3)	8
Month + year of agreement/contract/project (1)	1
nature of project (1)	1
ADVANCE NOTICE and PUBLIC PARTICIPATION	
full applications (5); applicant + amount (2); applicant (1)	5
cost-benefit analysis at least 15 days in advance (3)	3
full proposal (4); program + applicant (3); program/agenda (2); dates (1)	4
full draft agreements ahead of approval (3); full agreements after (1)	3
AWARDEE INFO	
federal employer identification number (1)	1
NAICS code (1)	1
parent company for all awardees (3)	3
SUBSIDY INFO	
approved/awarded subsidy value (4)	4
disbursed/claimed subsidy amount (6)	6
Status + penalty actions (10); status (5)	10
JOBS REPORTING	
number of projected new/retained jobs/trainees (6)	6
number of actual new/retained jobs/trainees (14)	14
WAGES REPORTING	
projected wage/payroll for new/retained jobs (5)	5
actual wage/payroll for new/retained jobs (10)	10
INVESTMENT REPORTING	
projected capital investment/expenditure/cost (1)	1
actual capital investment/expenditure/cost (4)	4
DATA ACCESSIBILITY	
two clicks from program page (3); - 1 for every additional click	3
unambiguous data and explanations (2)	2
five years of data placed together (2); on different pages (1)	2
structured downloads (3); unstructured downloads (1)	3
TOTAL PROGRAM SCORE	**100**

APPENDIX B: STATE PROGRAM SCORES

STATE	PROGRAM	SCORE
Alabama	Alabama Film Rebate Incentives	0
	Alabama Industrial Development Training	0
	Income Tax Capital Credit	0
	Jobs Credit	0
	State Industrial Development Grant (Site Prep)	0
Alaska	Commercial Fishing Revolving Loan Program	0
	Development Finance Program	35
	Oil and Gas Tax Credit Fund	14
Arizona	Arizona Competes Fund	40
	Computer Data Center Incentive Program	12
	Qualified Facility Incentive Program	14
	Quality Jobs Tax Credit	35
	Research and Development Tax Credit	12
Arkansas	ArkPlus Income Tax Credit	0
	Business and Industry Training Program	15
	Create Rebate Program	15
	In-House Research and Development Program	0
	InvestArk Sales and Use Tax Credits	0
California	California Competes	37
	Employment Training Panel	60
	Film and TV Production Tax Credit	29
	New Employment Credit	29
	Research Credit	0
Colorado	Enterprise Zones	35
	Film Incentive	0
	Job Growth Incentive Tax Credit	35
	Strategic Fund Incentive	36
Connecticut	Film and Digital Media Tax Credits	21
	Manufacturing Assistance Act	55
	Sales and Use Tax Exemption	64
	Special Act- Lockheed Martin	69
	The Urban and Industrial Sites Reinvestment Tax Program	49

Delaware	Bank Franchise Tax Credits	0
	Blue Collar Training Program	0
	Delaware Strategic Fund	25
	Research and Development Tax Credit	0
	Transportation Infrastructure Investment Fund (TIIF)	0
District of Columbia	Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT)	0
	Property Tax Abatements and Exemptions	39
	Qualified High Technology Company	0
	Supermarket Tax Incentives	21
	Tax Increment Financing (TIF)	0
Florida	Capital Investment Tax Credit	40
	Economic Development Transportation Projects	0
	Entertainment Industry Sales Tax Exemption	0
	Qualified Target Industry Tax Refund	59
	Quick Action Closing Fund	61
Georgia	Economic Development, Growth and Expansion (EDGE) Fund	0
	Film Tax Credit	0
	Job Tax Credit	0
	Quality Jobs Tax Credit	0
	Regional Economic Business Assistance (REBA)	0
Hawaii	Employment Training Fund	0
	Enterprise Zones	11
	Motion Picture, Digital Media, & Film Production Income Tax Credit	0
	Tax Credit for Research Activities	12
Idaho	3 Percent Investment Tax Credit	0
	Business Advantage Program	0
	Data Center Sales Tax Exemption	0
	Idaho Opportunity Fund	0
	Tax Reimbursement Incentive	28
Illinois	Data Center Investment Program	58
	Economic Development for a Growing Economy (EDGE) Tax Credit Program	57
	High Impact Business (HIB) Program	58
	Illinois Enterprise Zone Program	59
	Illinois Film Production/Services Tax Credit	0
Indiana	Economic Development for a Growing Economy (EDGE) - Payroll Tax Credit	55
	Headquarters Relocation Tax Credit	56
	Hoosier Business Investment Tax Credit	56
	Research Expense Credit	0
	Skills Enhancement Fund	56

Iowa	High Quality Jobs Program (HQJP)	51
	Iowa Industrial New Jobs Training Program	27
	Large data center business exemption	0
	Research Activities Credit	9
	Targeted Jobs Withholding Tax Credit	55
Kansas	High Performance Incentive Program (HPIP)	15
	Kansas Job Creation Fund	52
	Promoting Employment Across Kansas (PEAK)	49
	Research & Development Tax Credit	0
	STAR Bonds	28
Kentucky	Bluegrass State Skills Corporation Grant-in-Aid Program	62
	Kentucky Business Investment (KBI) Program	37
	Kentucky Enterprise Initiative Act (KEIA)	37
	Kentucky Film Industry Tax Credit	27
	Tax Increment Financing	0
Louisiana	Digital Interactive Media and Software Credit	0
	Enterprise Zones	46
	Industrial Tax Exemption Program	50
	Motion Picture Production Tax Credit	0
	Quality Jobs Program	47
Maine	Business Equipment Tax Exemption (BETE)	0
	Business Equipment Tax Reimbursement (BETR)	12
	Employment Tax Increment Financing	0
	Pine Tree Development Zone	0
	Shipbuilding Facility Credit	0
Maryland	Advantage Maryland (MEDAAF)	35
	Film Production Activity Tax Credit	37
	Job Creation Tax Credit	18
	One Maryland Tax Credit	18
	Research and Development Tax Credit	18
Massachusetts	Economic Development Incentive Program (EDIP)	53
	Film Tax Incentive Program	19
	Investment Tax Credit	0
	Life Sciences Tax Incentive Program	11
	Research Tax Credit	0
Michigan	Good Jobs for Michigan	63
	Jobs Ready Michigan	27
	Michigan Business Development Program	61
	Michigan Economic Growth Authority (MEGA)	31
	State Essential Services Assessment (SESA) Exemption +Alternative	25

Minnesota	Data Center Incentive Program	0
	Greater Minnesota Public Infrastructure Grant Program	0
	Minnesota Job Creation Fund	65
	Partnership Program	22
	Research & Development Tax Credit	0
Mississippi	Ace Fund	25
	Advantage Jobs Program	17
	Data Center Enterprises Incentives	0
	Jobs Tax Credit	0
	Motion Picture Incentive Program	0
Missouri	Business Use Incentives for Large Scale Development	16
	Data Center Sales Tax Exemption	0
	Missouri Manufacturing Jobs Act	39
	Missouri Quality Jobs	36
	Missouri Works	22
Montana	Big Sky Development Trust Fund Program Job Creation Projects	46
	Infrastructure User Fee Credit	0
	Montana Big Sky Film Grant	32
	Primary Sector Workforce Training Grant	37
	Tax Increment Financing	0
Nebraska	Customized Job Training Program	31
	Employment Investment and Growth Act (LB 775)	17
	ImagiNE Nebraska Act	0
	Nebraska Advantage Act	17
	Nebraska Advantage Research and Development Act	0
Nevada	Data Centers Tax Abatement	68
	Modified Business Tax Abatement	68
	Personal Property Tax Abatement	68
	Sales and Use Tax Abatement	68
	Transferable Tax Credit for Film and Other Productions	46
New Hampshire	Community Development Investment Program	13
	Coos County Job Creation Tax Credit	0
	Economic Revitalization Zone Tax Credits	0
	Research and Development Tax Credit	0
	WorkInvestNH	0
New Jersey	Aspire	18
	Business Employment Incentive Program (BEIP)	39
	Emerge Program	18
	Film And Digital Media Tax Credit Program	35
	Research and Development Tax Credit	0

New Mexico	Film Production Tax Credit	0
	High Wage Jobs Tax Credit	0
	Job Training Incentive Program	25
	Local Economic Development Act	24
	Tax Increment Development Districts	0
New York	Brownfields	25
	Empire Zones	52
	Excelsior Jobs Program	23
	Film and Commercial Production Credit	42
	Industrial Development Agencies (IDAs)	64
North Carolina	Customized Training program	30
	Data Centers Sales and Use Tax Exemptions (three programs)	0
	Job Development Investment Grant (JDIG)	71
	North Carolina Film and Entertainment Grant	51
	One North Carolina Program	57
North Dakota	New Jobs Training Program	0
	New/Expanding Business Corporate Income Tax Exemption	0
	North Dakota Development Fund	12
	Renaissance Zone	0
	Research Expense Credit	0
Ohio	Facilities Establishment Fund	22
	Job Creation Tax Credit (JCTC)	45
	Job Retention Tax Credit	41
	Motion Picture Tax Credit	0
	Research and Development Investment Tax Credit	0
Oklahoma	Investment/New Jobs Tax Credit	16
	Oklahoma Film Enhancement Rebate	0
	Quality Jobs Programs	19
	Quick Action Closing Fund	16
	Training for Industry	0
Oregon	Enterprise Zone	48
	Long-Term Rural Enterprise Zone	19
	Oregon Investment Advantage	38
	Strategic Investment Program	22
	The Greenlight Oregon Labor Rebate	33
Pennsylvania	Film Production Tax Credit	31
	Keystone Innovation Zone Tax Credits	23
	Keystone Opportunity Zone Program	0
	Pennsylvania First Grant	20
	Research and Development Tax Credit	17

Rhode Island	Jobs Development Act	18
	Jobs Training Tax Credit	0
	Manufacturing Investment Tax Credits	0
	Motion Picture Production Tax Credits	23
	Tax Increment Financing	27
South Carolina	Closing Fund	55
	Investment Tax Credit	0
	Job Development Credits	39
	Job Tax Credit	0
	Motion Picture Film Rebates	20
South Dakota	Reinvestment Payment Program	28
	Revolving Economic Development and Initiative (REDI) Fund	16
	South Dakota Jobs Grant Program	16
	South Dakota Works	13
	Workforce Development Program	0
Tennessee	Data Centers Sales Tax Exemption	0
	FastTrack programs	48
	Industrial Machinery Credit	0
	Jobs Tax Credit	0
	Tennessee Film/Tv Production Incentive	0
Texas	Enterprise Zones	25
	Event Trust Funds Program	0
	Texas Data Center Program Exemption	7
	Texas Economic Development Act (Ch. 313)	85
	Texas Enterprise Fund	62
Utah	Economic Development Tax Increment Financing	28
	Enterprise Zone Tax Credit	0
	Industrial Assistance Account	15
	Motion Picture Incentive Program	0
	Tax Credit for Increasing Research Activities in Utah	0
Vermont	Economic Development Authority Direct Loan Program	16
	Tax Increment Financing	14
	Vermont Employment Growth Incentive	38
	Vermont Training Program	45
	Workforce Education and Training Fund	8
Virginia	Commonwealth's Development Opportunity Fund	79
	Data Center Retail Sales and Use Tax Exemption	19
	Enterprise Zone Grants	55
	Motion Picture Opportunity Fund	71
	Special Workforce Grant Program	0

Washington	Aerospace Preproduction Expenditures B&O Tax Credit	38
	Data Center Sales & Use Tax Exemption	38
	Production Incentive Program	0
	Washington's Job Skills Program	47
West Virginia	"Five-for-Ten" Program	0
	Economic Opportunity Tax Credit	0
	Governor's Guaranteed Work Force Program	40
	High Technology Valuation Act (Data Centers)	0
	Manufacturing Investment Tax Credit	0
Wisconsin	Business Development Tax Credit	63
	Enterprise Zone Tax Credit	62
	Manufacturing and Agricultural Credit	0
	Qualified New Business Venture	35
	Technology Development Loan	36
Wyoming	Business Ready Community Grants	29
	Business Ready Community Managed Data Center Cost Reduction Grant	18
	Data Center Sales Tax Exemption	0
	Economic Development Large Project Loan Program	0
	Workforce Development Training Fund	0

APPENDIX C: STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARY

Alabama

Despite expensive subsidy packages to companies, Alabama does not have any recipient-level subsidy disclosure, either for grants or tax-based subsidies. It is safe to say that Alabama is one of the "darkest" states in the country.

Alaska

Alaska has improved its recipient-level disclosure for programs that subsidize infrastructure build-out for companies such as those extracting natural resources. But its tax-based subsidies have only limited disclosure.

Arizona

The privatized Arizona Commerce Authority publishes an annual report on its tax incentive programs that varies from program to program in the amount of information provided because of confidentiality laws.

Arkansas

Arkansas does not disclose recipients of its tax-based subsidies but grants and rebates are posted to the state transparency website, Transparency.Arkansas.gov.

California

California has decent disclosure for most of its programs, doing particularly well with advanced notice and public participation. Its costly film subsidy program discloses jobs created, but not subsidies claimed. Unfortunately, the state's most expensive program, a research credit, still has no disclosure whatsoever.

Colorado

The programs in Colorado that have transparency can be found on the state's economic development site. They each have different levels of disclosure for subsidy recipients, but all of them report job outcomes. Unfortunately, the site does not make the data easy to find.

Connecticut

Overall, Connecticut has a decent disclosure of subsidy recipients, including outcomes. The data is posted to the Connecticut Open Data portal and is included in the Department of Economic and Community Development annual reports. Sales and Use Tax Exemptions have some level of pre-approval transparency.

Delaware

By starting to disclose annually recipients of its grant programs, Delaware moved from having no recipient disclosure at all to having a partial one. Recipients of tax-based subsidies are still not disclosed.

District of Columbia

Washington DC offers only partial transparency of companies benefiting from its subsidies. Disclosure documents are hard to find, use, seem incomplete, and have limited data. However, Property Tax Abatements and

Exemptions must go through a rigorous and open to the public pre-approval process.

Florida

Florida's Economic Development Incentives Portal includes outcome data for refunds and grants, but the dollar amounts of income tax credits are not disclosed. The state's subsidy deals can be exempt from disclosure for two years after they are approved by the "Sunshine State." Before deals are executed, businesses seeking subsidies are also granted confidential status.

Georgia

Georgia posts online limited recipient data for two grant programs, but after 30 days the information is removed. To us, this constitutes non-disclosure (the data can be obtained via a freedom of information request). Other programs are not transparent, including its $1 billion film production subsidy.

Hawaii

Hawaii has minimal recipient level disclosure. It only includes company names and county location for Enterprise Zone and R&D tax credits. Film subsidy, one of the most expensive economic development programs in the state, has no recipient transparency whatsoever.

Idaho

Idaho is a mostly "dark" state. The one program that gets disclosed uses project code names for many of the recipients, making them unidentifiable.

Illinois

Illinois has a dedicated office for accountability that maintains a database of incentives with a decent amount of information for each project, but it is slow to update. Unveiled in 2005 after a 2003 Good Jobs First study prompted reform legislation, the state's portal won our 2010 and 2014 rankings. But other states have since made more progress.

Indiana

Indiana is one of the few states that post full agreements on its disclosure website.

Iowa

Iowa has partial recipient disclosure of its major subsidies via the Iowa Economic Development Authority's Annual Reports and the Iowa Open Data Portal. Those include subsidy amounts approved but not paid out. Job outcomes are available only for some programs. Targeted Jobs Withholding Tax Credit has limited pre-approval disclosure.

Kansas

Because of a 2019 law, Kansas advanced from being no-disclosure state to having, overall, a sufficient transparency for its major programs, including its controversial Promoting Employment Across Kansas program. The High Performance Incentive Program, with transferable corporate income tax credits, has no subsidy or outcome disclosure, but now at least we know which companies benefit from it.

Kentucky

Programs administered by the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority are disclosed in a database, but its Tax Increment Financing districts are not centrally disclosed even though they cost the state $50 million a year.

Louisiana

Louisiana is one of the more transparent states in that board-approved programs are disclosed with thorough details, including applicants waiting for approval. However, it used to be even better before it stopped reporting tax benefits beyond the first year for its monstrous Industrial Tax Exemption Program.

Maine

Maine has almost no recipient-level transparency for its subsidy programs. The expired but still active Business Equipment Tax Reimbursement (BETR) program discloses only company names and subsidy amounts. A program that succeeded BETR has no company level transparency.

Maryland

Despite a full database of incentives (see Figure 8) and a library of documents with recipient disclosures, information on job and wage outcomes is lacking.

Massachusetts

Massachusetts is big on subsidizing the sciences, particularly biopharmaceutical research. There is detailed information but presented in a format that does not allow for easy analysis. And some of the costlier tax credits are as-of-right and non-transparent.

Michigan

All major Michigan programs are transparent, with its grants and rebates disclosing subsidy amounts and outcomes. Michigan also offers limited pre-approval transparency. The Michigan Economic Growth Authority (MEGA), a controversial and expensive legacy program, lost some of its recipient-level disclosure over time.

Minnesota

Minnesota was the first state to enact a subsidy disclosure law, in 1995. The resulting data enabled Good Jobs First to publish some of its pioneering studies in 1999 and 2000. However, now many of the state's tax-based subsidies are undisclosed and data for programs that are transparent is hard to use and navigate. Minnesota provides some pre-approval transparency for the Job Creation Fund.

Mississippi

The Mississippi Development Authority discloses some recipient data, but no outcomes, for its grant and rebate programs. Tax-based subsidies have no disclosure at all.

Missouri

Missouri is one of the more transparent states. The Department of Economic Development publishes annual reports on major programs and maintains a portal with additional information in structured text for some tax credits, loans, and grants.

Montana

The Montana Department of Commerce maintains a data portal with information on its loans and grants, but not tax breaks.

Nebraska

Nebraska's revenue department publishes annual reports on its tax incentives going back to 1997, while its economic development department discloses grant recipients in its annual reports with more information than the former on project outcomes.

Nevada

A law enacted in 2015 that requires the Governor Office of Economic Development to disclose recipient level data for various tax abatements took Nevada from having the lowest score in 2014 to the top score in this study. Its programs scored higher than most in anticipated and actual jobs, wages, expenditures/investments, as well as advanced notice and public participation

New Hampshire

The only information available for New Hampshire is a list of companies participating in its nonprofit donation program and some dated information for its training program.

New Jersey

At the time of the study research, two evaluated programs were too new to have published transparency reports. We used the programs' regulations to assess recipient level transparency but there were few guidelines on what the disclosure might look like (the law does require bi-annual project evaluation by a state university). Legacy and existing programs have a fair amount of company data. The New Jersey Economic Development Authority posts online some information on companies applying for subsidies.

New Mexico

New Mexico's only two programs with recipient level data are the Job Training Incentive Program and the Local Economic Development Act. Both programs disclose subsidy amounts approved but not paid out, and projected jobs. Its film production tax credit has no transparency despite being one of the most expensive programs in the state.

New York

The Empire State Development Corporation publishes datasets on incentives (including the local Industrial Development Agencies projects) in the state's open data portal and issues reports on certain programs, but not all programs are complete with the key pieces of subsidy transparency. A reform coalition seeks to have the state enact a "Database of Deals" to address numerous deficiencies.

North Carolina

Overall, North Carolina has a good recipient-level disclosure for its major programs, making the state's transparency one of the best in the South. (Indeed, the Tarheel State was a very early adopter of online disclosure, even of tax credits, starting in 2003.) However, the state could improve accessibility and usability of its disclosure data.

North Dakota

North Dakota is a mostly "dark" state that has information only for its Development Fund program, though it is not big on subsidies either.

Ohio

Although its privatized Jobs Ohio agency is not subject to open record laws, an executive order mandated the disclosure of both tax breaks and grants and loans in a central portal. The Department of Development also issues annual reports with extensive tables on major state programs as well as the local enterprise zones. Ohio was the first state with online disclosure, of those EZs, in 1999.

Oklahoma

Oklahoma's disclosures are all over the place: There is an outdated portal that has data but only up to 2014, and a series of well-hidden reports by the Tax Commission on a few tax breaks. Its costly film program, however, remains non-transparent even after the cap was raised from $8 to $30 million in 2021.

Oregon

Oregon discloses recipient data for all its major subsidies, but the disclosure quality varies by program, from good on Enterprise Zones to minimal and hard to use for the Long-Term Rural Enterprise Zones. The Oregon Business Commission posts information on companies applying for some subsidy programs ahead of approval.

Pennsylvania

Despite having three disclosure sites (an online document library, the "Investment Tracker," and the treasury's contract repositories), there is no disclosure of its biggest program—the Keystone Opportunity Zones and all its offshoots.

Rhode Island

The revenue department publishes annual reports on its tax incentive programs, including the very unusual Jobs Development Act which permanently lowers the income tax rate (subject to maintaining jobs count) for recipient corporations.

South Carolina

South Carolina has advanced from being a state with marginal disclosure to a state that provides recipient level data, including outcomes, for its grants. But the Job Development Credit still does not disclose subsidy amounts. The improvements do not cover tax-based subsidies which still have no recipient-level transparency.

South Dakota

The South Dakota Office of Economic Development publishes annual reports for programs and maintains a portal of contracts and grants, but its training program, administered by a separate agency, is not transparent.

Tennessee

Tennessee has fair recipient level disclosure of its FastTrack grants, which includes job outcomes and some level of pre-approval transparency (the state could improve on the usability of the data). Nevertheless, its tax-based subsidies have no recipient level transparency.

Texas

Texas recipient-level transparency varies by program. Chapter 313 has one of the best disclosures, especially because there is a good amount of advance information on companies applying for the subsidy. Other programs lack even beneficiary names, subsidy amounts, or jobs data.

Utah

Out of Utah's five programs, only two have recipient level data: Economic Development Tax Increment Financing and the Industrial Assistance Account. Both programs have some of the lowest scores for data accessibility.

Vermont

Recipients of loans, grants, and tax breaks are disclosed in annual program reports.

Virginia

Virginia maintains a database of funds and grants that include rare enforcement actions like clawbacks. Its tax incentives, however, are disclosed only temporarily in pdf documents with tables (old ones are taken down when new ones are uploaded).

Washington

The Washington Department of Revenue posts basic recipient-level data (company names, subsidy payments, and job/wage data) on dozens of tax-based subsidies. On the good side, the data is (mostly) easy to access and use.

West Virginia

A 2021 law requires the state Auditor's Office to post online recipient level data for grant programs, but it is unclear for which ones. At the time of the study research, the disclosure portal was not yet active; and only a workforce development program had a limited level of company disclosure.

Wisconsin

On the main website is a spreadsheet for all programs since 2011 administered by the privatized Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation and another for all pre-2011 programs administered by the now-defunct commerce department. There is also an interactive map that displays information by program types.

Wyoming

Wyoming is the most backslid state. The only records that can be found now are the recipients of loans and grants made under the Business Ready program.

ENDNOTES

1 Miller, J. (2021, May 12). Texas' Largest Corporate Welfare Program Is Leaving Companies Flush and School Districts Broke. *Texas Observer*. https://www.texasobserver.org/texas-largest-corporate-welfare-program-is-leaving-companies-flush-and-school-districts-broke/

2 Morris, M., Tedesco, J. & Lamm, S. (2021, May 16). Ordinary Texans struggle with property taxes while companies save $10 billion. *The Houston Chronicle*. https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/investigations/unfair-burden/article/unfair-burden-part-1-texas-tax-corporations-covid-16164744.php

3 The Texas Public Policy Foundation. (2021, May 7). TPPF, Every Texan Joint Statement Opposing Unjustified Business Tax Breaks. [Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.texaspolicy.com/press/tppf-every-texan-joint-statement-opposing-unjustified-business-tax-breaks

4 The Editorial Board. (2021, December 10). Hegar wants to hide info on corporate welfare; Texans need more transparency on the state's wasteful '313' program - not less. [Editorial]. *The Houston Chronicle* https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Editorial-Texans-need-more-information-on-16689629.php

5 Morris, M. & Tedesco, J. (2022, January 29). Hegar drops plan on tax data. *The Houston Chronicle*. https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/After-backlash-Texas-comptroller-abandons-plan-16814556.php

6 LaFaive, M. (2022, March 11). Opinion: Politicians signing NDAs when giving subsidies to companies is a terrible idea. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/11/lawmaker-nondisclosure-agreements-are-a-terrible-idea/

7 The Editorial Board. (2019, August 17). Empty promises for Nevada tax breaks. [Editorial]. *Las Vegas Review-Journal*. https://www.reviewjournal.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-empty-promises-for-nevada-tax-breaks-1828877/

DeHaven, J. (2019, July 24). Are Tesla-style tax breaks working as promised? *Reno Gazette-Journal*. Via LexisNexis

8 Fiscal Research Center of the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University (2021). *Georgia Tax Expenditure Report for FY 2023*. The Governor's Office Planning and Budget. https://opb.georgia.gov/budget-information/budget-documents/tax-expenditure-reports

9 Let's say a state scored 50 out of 100 in both years. Its Z-score would be 1.89 in 2022 and 1.77 in 2014, which means that a score of 50 in 2022 is better and more transparent than a score of 50 in 2014. In other words, even though the state's raw score did not change, its transparency has improved because it's harder in 2022 to "depart" from the average (i.e., a state had to stand out among its peers in a good way or a bad way more in 2022 than in 2014 to obtain the same raw score).

10 Alfred I. duPont Awards. (2011, August 9). *Reality Check: Where Are the Jobs?" WTHR-TV, Indianapolis & Bob Segall | 2011 duPont-Columbia Awards Winner* [Video]. Vimeo. https://vimeo.com/27502609

goodjobsfirst.org

1380 Monroe St NW
PMB 405
Washington DC 20010
202-232-1616

GOOD JOBS FIRST .ORG